Results 271 to 280 of about 5,619,361 (305)

Bargaining or Problem Solving?

1994
Abstract Chapter 5 concluded that subcontracting relations in a sample of electronics producers from Japan were on the whole more asset specific than were those in a comparable sample from the United Kingdom and that strategy probably matters in determining the degree of asset specificity.
openaire   +1 more source

A superadditive solution for cephoidal bargaining problems

International Journal of Game Theory, 2006
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Pallaschke, Diethard, Rosenmueller, Joachim   +1 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Towards Interactive Solutions in a Bargaining Problem

1989
The paper deals with interactive arbitration processes in a bargaining problem. Principles of constructing such processes are discussed, and several solution concepts are considered, first in unicriterial and then in multicriterial case. The analysis is preceded by a review of the axiomatic basis of Nash and Raiffa solution concepts.
Bronisz, Piotr, Krus, Lech, Wierzbicki, A.P.   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources

A characterization of the leximin solution of the bargaining problem

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research (ZOR), 1999
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Chih Chang, Yan-An Hwang
openaire   +2 more sources

Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information [PDF]

Econometrica, 1984
Summary: A generalization of the Nash bargaining solution is defined for two- person bargaining problems with incomplete information. These solutions form the smallest set satisfying three axioms: a probability-invariance axiom, an extension (or independence of irrelevant alternatives) axiom, and a random-dictatorship axiom.
openaire   +2 more sources

Information and bargaining in the hold‐up problem

The RAND Journal of Economics, 2008
This article incorporates an information structure with partial information into the canonical hold‐up problem. The optimal information structure balances the tradeoff between ex ante efficiency (the “information rent” effect) and ex post efficiency (the “bargaining disagreement” effect). With one‐shot bargaining, it occurs at an intermediate level of
openaire   +1 more source

Pure Bargaining Problems and the Shapley Rule

2013
The developments over a thirty-year time span in the study of power, especially voting power, are traced in this book, which provides an up-to-date overview of applications of n-person game theory to the study of power in multimember bodies. Other theories that shed light on power distribution (e.g. aggregation theory) are treated as well.
Carreras Escobar, Francisco, Owen Salazar, Guillermo   +1 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Finite Bargaining Problems

2007
Bargaining is a process to decide how to divide shared resources between two or more players. And axiomatic bargaining specifies desirable and simple properties the outcome of the bargaining should satisfy and identifies the solution that produces this outcome. This approach was first developed by John Nash in his seminal work(Nash 1950). Since then,
openaire   +1 more source

On pure bargaining problems

2010
Pure bargaining problems are considered. By attaching a quasi–additive cooperative game to each one of them, a Shapley rule for this class of problems is derived from the Shapley value for cooperative games. The analysis of this new rule includes some axiomatic characterizations and a comparison with the classical proportional rule.
openaire   +1 more source

Weak stability against robust deviations and the bargaining set in the roommate problem

Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023
Kentaro Tomoeda, Yusuke Kasuya, Daisuke Hirata   +2 more
exaly