Results 1 to 10 of about 20,204 (286)
Model-based fMRI reveals dissimilarity processes underlying base rate neglect [PDF]
eLife, 2018 Extensive evidence suggests that people use base rate information inconsistently in decision making. A classic example is the inverse base rate effect (IBRE), whereby participants classify ambiguous stimuli sharing features of both common and rare ...
Sean R O'Bryan +3 more
doaj +7 more sources
The effects of base rate neglect on sequential belief updating and real-world beliefs. [PDF]
PLoS Computational Biology, 2022 Base-rate neglect is a pervasive bias in judgment that is conceptualized as underweighting of prior information and can have serious consequences in real-world scenarios.
Brandon K Ashinoff +3 more
doaj +5 more sources
Base-rate neglect as a function of base rates in probabilistic contingency learning. [PDF]
J Exp Anal Behav, 2008 When humans predict criterion events based on probabilistic predictors, they often lend excessive weight to the predictor and insufficient weight to the base rate of the criterion event. In an operant analysis, using a matching‐to‐sample paradigm, Goodie and Fantino (1996) showed that humans exhibit base‐rate neglect when predictors are associated with
Kutzner F +3 more
europepmc +6 more sources
Base rate neglect and conservatism in probabilistic reasoning: Insights from eliciting full distributions [PDF]
Judgment and Decision Making, 2022 Bayesian statistics offers a normative description for how a person should combine their original beliefs (i.e., their priors) in light of new evidence (i.e., the likelihood).
Piers Douglas Lionel Howe +4 more
doaj +5 more sources
On the generality and cognitive basis of base-rate neglect [PDF]
Cognition, 2021 ABSTRACTBase rate neglect refers to people’s apparent tendency to underweight or even ignore base rate information when estimating posterior probabilities for events, such as the probability that a person with a positive cancer-test outcome actually does have cancer. While often replicated, almost all evidence for the phenomenon comes from studies that
Elina Stengård +3 more
+7 more sources
The environmental malleability of base-rate neglect [PDF]
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 2020 Across two experiments (N=799) we demonstrate that people's use of quantitative information (e.g., base-rates) when making a judgment varies as the causal link of qualitative information (e.g., stereotypes) changes. That is, when a clear causal link for stereotypes is provided, people make judgments that are far more in line with them.
Martin Harry, Turpin +5 more
openaire +3 more sources
Cognitive biases as Bayesian probability weighting in context [PDF]
Frontiers in PsychologyIntroductionHumans often exhibit systematic biases in judgments under uncertainty, such as conservatism bias and base-rate neglect. This study investigates the context dependence of these biases within a Bayesian framework.MethodsForty-eight participants
Bruno Kopp
doaj +2 more sources
Neglect the Base Rate: It's the Law! [PDF]
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2012 If accurate prediction is the goal, and if information about the unconditional probability of the predicted event is available, a strong case can be made for using this information, i.e. for a Bayesian approach to inference. Not so rarely, the law calls for accurate prediction, e.g. if a bailing decision hinges on an estimate of recidivism risk.
Christoph Engel
+6 more sources
Base-rate training without case cues reduces base-rate neglect [PDF]
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1999 Base-rate neglect is a persistent phenomenon in which subjects do not place sufficient weight on the probabilities of occurrence of relevant events. Two experiments with college students support the hypothesis that base-rate neglect may be minimized by providing base-rate training in the absence of case, or witness, cues, prior to introducing (or ...
D A, Case, E, Fantino, A S, Goodie
openaire +4 more sources
Base-Rate Neglect and Imperfect Information Acquisition [PDF]
, 2005 Base-rate neglect is a robust experimental finding that individuals do not update their prior beliefs according to the Bayes' rule and, typically, underestimate their posterior probabilities. Another empirical finding is that individuals often do not acquire information even when there are no strategic considerations and the cost of new information is ...
Wichardt, Philipp C, Blavatskyy, Pavlo R
openaire +4 more sources