Results 101 to 110 of about 8,827 (199)
Learning in Perturbed Asymmetric Games [PDF]
We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero ...
Ed Hopkins, Josef Hofbauer
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Rationalizability and Minimal Complexity in Dynamic Games
This paper presents a formal epistemic framework for dynamic games in which players, during the course of the game, may revise their beliefs about the opponents'' utility functions.
Perea,Andrés
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The existence and uniqueness of monotone pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian games
, 2007 This paper provides a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information.
Valentinyi, Ákos, Mason, Robin
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Quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms
Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism ...
Wu, Haoyang
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What restrictions do Bayesian games impose on the value of information? [PDF]
In a Bayesian game players play an unknown game. Before the game starts some players may receive a signal regarding the specific game actually played.
Ehud Lehrer, Dinah Rosenberg
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Learning in perturbed asymmetric games
, 2004 We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response dynamics. A mixed equilibrium is asymptotically stable under all such dynamics if and only if the game is linearly equivalent to a zero ...
Hopkins, E +5 more
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The existence and uniqueness of monotone pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian games [PDF]
This paper provides a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information.
Valentinyi, Ãkos, Mason, Robin
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Belief-free equilibria in games with incomplete information [PDF]
We de ne belief-free equilibria in two-player games with incomplete information as se- quential equilibria for which players' continuation strategies are best-replies, after every history, independently of their beliefs about the state of nature.
Stefano, LOVO
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Preliminary Results for Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game [PDF]
The descriptive theory of cooperative game with incomplete information developed to date is surveyed. The theory has the potential to provide game-theoretical foundations of economic analysis of the free societies in which organizations (coalitions) as ...
Ichiishi, Tatsuro, Yamazaki, Akira
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