IMPLEMENTATION WITH STATE DEPENDENT FEASIBLE SETS AND PREFERENCES: A RENEGOTIATION APPROACH [PDF]
In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of ...
Matteo Triosi, Luis C. Corchon
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Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Variational Inequalities
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium and Variational InequalitiesFirst Version: November 2004, This Version: October ...
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Implementation in adaptive better-response dynamics: Towards a general theory of bounded rationality in mechanisms. [PDF]
We study the classic implementation problem under the behavioral assumption that agents myopically adjust their actions in the direction of better-responses or bestresponses.
Serrano, Roberto, Cabrales, Antonio
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Games of incomplete information without common knowledge priors [PDF]
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomplete information. We make the realistic assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they base their actions on finite-order belief hierarchies. When
Jozsef Sakovics
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On the existence of Nash Equilibrium in Bayesian Games [PDF]
, 2015 We furnish conditions on the primitives of a Bayesian game that guarantee the existence of a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. By allowing for payoff discontinuities in actions, we cover various applications that cannot be handled by extant ...
McLean, Richard P. +1 more
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A Unified Implementation Theory
This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation in a single framework. Environments considered are such that each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a specification of his private information, a commonly ...
Saglam, Ismail
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The existence and uniqueness of monotone pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian games [PDF]
This paper provides a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information.
Valentinyi, Ãkos, Mason, Robin
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Defense decision-making method based on incomplete information stochastic game
网络与信息安全学报, 2018 Most of the stochastic game models to select network defense strategies are composed of matrix game and Markov decision,which assumes that the defender has known the attacker's revenue.This assumption does not conform to the actual situation.The ...
Junnan YANG, Hongqi ZHANG, Chuanfu ZHANG
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Multiplicity of mixed equilibria in mechanisms: A unified approach to exact and approximate implementation [PDF]
We characterize full implementation of social choice sets in mixed strategy Bayesian equilibrium. Our results concern both exact and virtual mixed implementation.
Roberto Serrano, Rajiv Vohra
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The existence and uniqueness of monotone pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian games
, 2007 This paper provides a sufficient condition for existence and uniqueness of equilibrium, which is in monotone pure strategies, in games of incomplete information.
Valentinyi, Ákos, Mason, Robin
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