Results 91 to 100 of about 2,346 (213)
Trusted Transactions in Micro-Grid Based on Blockchain
In order to build a local electricity market (LEM), community members can trade electricity peer-to-peer (P2P) with their neighbors. This paper proposes a Hierarchical Bidding and Transaction Structure based on blockchain (HBTS). First, combined with the
Yunjun Yu +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Common data environments (CDEs) are centralized repositories in the architecture, engineering, and construction (AEC) industry designed to improve collaboration and project efficiency.
KC Lalropuia +4 more
doaj +1 more source
Altruistic Behavior and Correlated Equilibrium Selection [PDF]
This paper studies new refinement concepts for correlated equilibria based on altruistic behavior of the players and which generalize some refinement concepts introduced by the authors in previous papers for Nash equilibria. Effectiveness of the concepts,
Jacqueline Morgan, Giuseppe De Marco
core
Beyond Nash Equilibrium: Achieving Bayesian Perfect Equilibrium with Belief Update Fictitious Play
In the domain of machine learning and game theory, the quest for Nash Equilibrium (NE) in extensive-form games with incomplete information is challenging yet crucial for enhancing AI's decision-making support under varied scenarios. Traditional Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR) techniques excel in navigating towards NE, focusing on scenarios ...
Qi Ju 0001, Zhemei Fang, Yunfeng Luo
openaire +2 more sources
A Unified Theory of Implementation [PDF]
This paper unifies the theories of Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation. Environments considered are such that each agent's characteristics include, in addition to a specification of his private information, a commonly known type parameter ...
Ismail Saglam
core
Robust implementation under alternative information structures [PDF]
Nash Implementation, Incomplete information, Local information, CF2, DF1, D82,
Ignacio Ortuño-Ortin +3 more
core +1 more source
Beyond Normal Form Invariance : First Mover Advantage in Two-Stage Games with or without Predictable Cheap Talk [PDF]
Von Neumann (1928) not only introduced a fairly general version of the extensive form game concept. He also hypothesized that only the normal form was relevant to rational play.
Hammond, Peter J.
core
We study $n$-agent Bayesian Games with $m$-dimensional vector types and linear payoffs, also called Linear Multidimensional Bayesian Games. This class of games is equivalent with $n$-agent, $m$-game Uniform Multigames.
Huot, Sébastien, Edalat, Abbas
core
Nash Equilibrium as an Expression of Self-Referential Reasoning
Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents'' rationality (BOR), stating that a player should believe that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential ...
Perea, Andrés
core
Justifiability of Bayesian Implementation in Oligopolistic Markets
We show that in oligopolistic markets the social choice correspondence which selects all socially efficient outcomes is Nash implementable if the number of firms is at least two. Thus, monopoly regulation whenever consumers are favored by the designer or
Koray, Semih, Saglam, Ismail
core

