Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 28, Issue 3, June 2026.ABSTRACT We propose and study the following mechanism: Agents simultaneously make contributions. If the total contribution is below the cost, contributions are refunded; otherwise the public good is provided and budget surplus, if there is any, is shared equally among the agents.
Licun Xue
wiley +1 more source
Implementation with state dependent feasible sets and preferences: a renegotiation approach [PDF]
, 2005 In this paper we present a model of implementation based on the idea that agents renegotiate unfeasible allocations. We characterize the maximal set of Social Choice Correspondences that can be implemented in Nash Equilibrium with a class of ...
Luis C. Corchón +4 more
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Game Theory-Based Analysis of the Relationship between Managers and Shareholders: An Emphasis on Information Disclosure Quality, Audit Quality and Expected Return [PDF]
Iranian Journal of Accounting, Auditing & FinanceGame theory, or interactive decision-making theory, is a mathematical framework that helps predict the outcomes of a group of interacting agents. This research aims to design and describe strategic relations between managers and shareholders through ...
Zahra Moghadam +3 more
doaj +1 more source
Bayesian and Consistent Assessments [PDF]
In a Bayesian assessment beliefs are computed from the strategy profile following Bayes’ rule at positive probability information sets and for every subgame.
Carlos Pimienta
core
THE ROBUSTNESS OF EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS: THE CASE OF UNDOMINATED NASH EQUILIBRIUM [PDF]
I consider a strategic game form with a finite set of payoff states and employ undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) as a solution concept under complete information. I propose notions of the proximity of information according to which the continuity of UNE
Takashi Kunimoto
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Evolution and Correlated Equilibrium [PDF]
We show that a set of outcomes outside the convex hull of Nash equilibria can be asymptotically stable with respect to convex monotonic evolutionary dynamics. Boundedly rational agents receive signals and condition the choice of strategies on the signals.
Lars Koch
core
On Purification of Equilibrium in Bayesian Games and Ex-Post Nash Equilibrium [PDF]
Kalai (2002) demonstrates that in semi anonymous Bayesian games with sufficiently many players any Bayesian equilibrium is approximately ex-post Nash.
Edward Cartwright, Myrna Wooders
core +1 more source
Reinterpreting Mixed Strategy Equilibria: A Unification of the Classical and Bayesian Views [PDF]
We provide a new interpretation of mixed strategy equilibria that incorporates both von Neumann and Morgenstern's classical concealment role of mixing as well as the more recent Bayesian view originating with Harsanyi.
Robson, Arthur, Reny, Phil
core
Learning in General Games with Nature’s Moves
Journal of Applied Mathematics, 2014 This paper investigates simultaneous learning about both nature and others’ actions in repeated games and identifies a set of sufficient conditions for which Harsanyi’s doctrine holds.
Patrick L. Leoni
doaj +1 more source
Some first results for noncooperative pregames: social conformity and equilibrium in pure strategies [PDF]
, 2001 We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players, there exist approximate (E) Nash equilibria in pure strategies.
Wooders, Myrna Holtz +2 more
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