Results 221 to 230 of about 1,169 (252)

Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]

American Economic Review, 2011
When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We consider a symmetric information model where a sender chooses a signal to reveal to a receiver, who then takes a noncontractible action that affects the welfare of both players.
Emir Kamenica, Matthew Gentzkow
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Non-Bayesian Persuasion

Journal of Political Economy, 2022
Following Kamenica and Gentzkow, this paper studies persuasion as an information design problem. We investigate how mistakes in probabilistic inference impact optimal persuasion. The concavification method is shown to extend naturally to a large class of belief updating rules, which we identify and characterize.
De Clippel, Geoffroy, Zhang, Xu
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Signaling through Bayesian persuasion

Mathematical Social Sciences
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jonas Hedlund, Jonas Hedlund
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Sequential Bayesian Persuasion

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Almost-Bayesian Quadratic Persuasion

IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Olivier Massicot, Cédric Langbort
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Private Bayesian Persuasion

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2016
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Itai Arieli, Yakov Babichenko
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Ex-Post Individually Rational Bayesian Persuasion

Lecture Notes in Computer Science
In the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender\u27s commitment to a predetermined information disclosure
Zhiwei Steven Wu
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Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]

When is it possible for one person to persuade another to change her action? We take a mechanism design approach to this question. Taking preferences and initial beliefs as given, we introduce the notion of a persuasion mechanism: a game between Sender ...
Matthew Gentzkow, Emir Kamenica
openaire   +2 more sources

Bayesian Persuasion with Costly Messages

SSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Anh H. Nguyen 0002, Teck Yong Tan
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Bayesian Persuasion: From Persuasion toward Counter-Suasion

2024 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)
Amitalok J Budkuley
exaly   +2 more sources