Results 231 to 240 of about 942,691 (276)
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2019
We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver.
Itai Arieli, Y. Babichenko
semanticscholar +2 more sources
We consider a multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion problem where an informed sender tries to persuade a group of receivers to adopt a certain product. The sender is allowed to commit to a signaling policy where she sends a private signal to every receiver.
Itai Arieli, Y. Babichenko
semanticscholar +2 more sources
Signaling through Bayesian persuasion
Mathematical Social ScienceszbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jonas Hedlund
exaly +4 more sources
Bayesian Persuasion: From Persuasion toward Counter-Suasion
2024 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory (ISIT)We study the problem of Bayesian persuasion under receiver distrust. In the classical Bayesian persuasion problem introduced by Kamenica and Gentzkow [AER, 2011], there are two parties, a sender Alice and a receiver Bob, who engage in a one-way ...
Amitalok J. Budkuley
exaly +3 more sources
Bayesian persuasion in unlinked games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2021 AbstractOriginating from Kamenica and Gentzkow (Am Econ Rev 101(6):2590–2615, 2011), we analyze multi-receiver Bayesian persuasion games with heterogeneous beliefs without strategic interactions among receivers, which we call unlinked. We show that given the receivers’ best-responses, the sender’s rationalizable strategies are obtained from a single ...
Makoto Shimoji
exaly +5 more sources
Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Trials [PDF]
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, 2022 This is a camera-ready version of the 17th conference on web and internet economics (WINE 2021)
Grant Robert Schoenebeck
exaly +3 more sources
Ex-Post Individually Rational Bayesian Persuasion
Lecture Notes in Computer ScienceIn the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender\u27s commitment to a predetermined information disclosure
Zhiwei Steven Wu +2 more
exaly +2 more sources
Bayesian persuasion: Reduced form approach
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2023We introduce reduced form representations of Bayesian persuasion problems where the variables are the probabilities that the receiver takes each of her actions.
Rakesh V. Vohra
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Sequential Bayesian Persuasion
SSRN Electronic Journal, 2021zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
openaire +1 more source
The Role of Messenger in Advertising Content: Bayesian Persuasion Perspective
Marketing ScienceThis paper frames the choice of messenger in advertising content as a Bayesian persuasion problem and characterizes the optimal messenger choice.
Jiwoong Shin
exaly +2 more sources