Results 51 to 60 of about 13,242 (292)

Strategic Communication Between Prospect Theoretic Agents over a Gaussian Test Channel

open access: yes, 2017
In this paper, we model a Stackelberg game in a simple Gaussian test channel where a human transmitter (leader) communicates a source message to a human receiver (follower).
Akyol, Emrah   +3 more
core   +1 more source

Limiting Sender's Information in Bayesian Persuasion [PDF]

open access: yesSSRN Electronic Journal, 2018
This paper studies how the outcome of Bayesian persuasion depends on a sender’s information. I study a game in which, prior to the sender’s information disclosure, the designer can restrict the most informative signal that the sender can generate.
openaire   +2 more sources

Artificial intelligence and machine learning‐assisted digital applications for biopharmaceutical manufacturing

open access: yesBiotechnology Progress, EarlyView.
Abstract Artificial intelligence and automation are no longer just buzzwords in the biopharmaceutical industry. The manufacturing of a class of biologics, comprising monoclonal antibodies, cell therapies, and gene therapies, is far more complex than that of traditional small molecule drugs.
Shyam Panjwani, Hao Wei, John Mason
wiley   +1 more source

Bayesian Persuasion with Mediators

open access: yes, 2022
An informed sender communicates with an uninformed receiver through a sequence of uninformed mediators; agents' utilities depend on receiver's action and the state. For any number of mediators, the sender's optimal value is characterized. For one mediator, the characterization has a geometric meaning of constrained concavification of sender's utility ...
Arieli, Itai   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Bayesian Persuasion without Commitment

open access: green
We introduce a model of persuasion in which a sender without any commitment power privately gathers information about an unknown state of the world and then chooses what to verifiably disclose to a receiver. The receiver does not know how many experiments the sender is able to run, and may therefore be uncertain as to whether the sender disclosed all ...
Itai Arieli, Colin Stewart
openalex   +3 more sources

Consumer Adoption of Internet of Things

open access: yesJournal of Consumer Behaviour, Volume 24, Issue 2, Page 673-693, March 2025.
ABSTRACT The Internet of Things (IoT), a pivotal technology in enhancing user connectivity, faces a paradox: its widespread potential yet limited consumer adoption. This study addresses this dichotomy by synthesizing a large‐scale meta‐analytic structural equation modeling (MASEM) and hierarchical linear meta‐analysis (HiLMA) of 2736 effect sizes from ...
Wagner Junior Ladeira   +6 more
wiley   +1 more source

The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions: A Decision-Theoretic Approach [PDF]

open access: yes, 2015
This article reviews the formulation and evolution of the Philadelphia National Bank anticompetitive presumption through the lens of decision theory and Bayes Law.
Salop, Steven C.
core   +1 more source

Polling bias and undecided voter allocations: US Presidential elections, 2004 - 2016

open access: yes, 2019
Accounting for undecided and uncertain voters is a challenging issue for predicting election results from public opinion polls. Undecided voters typify the uncertainty of swing voters in polls but are often ignored or allocated to each candidate in a ...
Chaffee S. H.   +8 more
core   +1 more source

Private Bayesian Persuasion with Sequential Games

open access: yesProceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2020
We study an information-structure design problem (a.k.a. a persuasion problem) with a single sender and multiple receivers with actions of a priori unknown types, independently drawn from action-specific marginal probability distributions. As in the standard Bayesian persuasion model, the sender has access to additional information regarding the action
Celli, Andrea   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

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