Results 161 to 170 of about 595 (210)

Evolutionary dynamics in the two-locus two-allele model with weak selection. [PDF]

J Math Biol, 2018
Pontz M, Hofbauer J, Bürger R.
europepmc   +1 more source

Why are small males aggressive? [PDF]

Proc Biol Sci, 2005
Morrell LJ, Lindström J, Ruxton GD.
europepmc   +1 more source

Cooperation and self-interest: Pareto-inefficiency of Nash equilibria in finite random games. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A, 1998
Cohen JE.
europepmc   +1 more source

Cooperation, norms, and revolutions: a unified game-theoretical approach. [PDF]

PLoS One, 2010
Helbing D, Johansson A.
europepmc   +1 more source

Power asymmetry destabilizes reciprocal cooperation in social dilemmas

Colnaghi M, Santos FP, Van Lange PAM, Balliet D.   +3 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Pure Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games

International Game Theory Review
In this paper, we study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. Shapley, L. S. [[1964] Some topics in two-person games, in Advances in Game Theory, eds. Dresher, M., Shapley, L. S. & Tucker, A. W. Princeton (University Press, Princeton), pp.
Nagarajan Krishnamurthy, Lina Mallozzi
openaire   +3 more sources

Stochastic evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games

Journal of Theoretical Biology, 2010
Evolutionary game dynamics of two-player asymmetric games in finite populations is studied. We consider two roles in the game, roles alpha and beta. alpha-players and beta-players interact and gain payoffs. The game is described by a pair of matrices, which is called bimatrix.
大槻, 久, OHTSUKI, Hisashi
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On Random Symmetric Bimatrix Games

International Game Theory Review, 2020
An experiment was conducted on a sample of [Formula: see text] randomly generated symmetric bimatrix games with size [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. Distribution of support sizes and Nash equilibria are used to formulate a conjecture: for finding a symmetric NEP it is enough to check supports up to size [Formula: see text] whereas for ...
Jozsef Abaffy, Ferenc Forgó
openaire   +2 more sources

Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games

Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1964
An algebraic proof is given of the existence of equilibrium points for bimatrix (or two-person, non-zero-sum) games. The proof is constructive, leading to an efficient scheme for computing an equilibrium point. In a nondegenerate case, the number of equilibrium points is finite and odd. The proof is valid for any ordered field.
Lemke, C. E., Howson, J. T. jun.
openaire   +4 more sources

Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games [PDF]

Econometrica, 2006
The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the ...
Rahul Savani, Bernhard Von Stengel
exaly   +2 more sources