Results 151 to 160 of about 561,032 (197)

On 'informationally robust equilibria' for bimatrix games. [PDF]

Borm, P.E.M., Voorneveld, M., Reijnierse, J.H.   +2 more
core  

A taxonomy of best-reply multifunctions in 2x2x2 trimatix games. [PDF]

Borm, P.E.M., Gonzalez-Alcon, C., Hendrickx, R.L.P., Kuijk, K. van   +3 more
core  

Interval valued bimatrix games [PDF]

Kybernetika, 2010
This paper deals with a two-player simultaneous game with finite strategy sets. Instead of precise payoffs for the players, the upper and lower values of there payoffs are known. It is shown that the existence of an equilibrium for such an interval game is equivalent to the solvability of a certain linear integer system of equations and inequalities ...
Hladík, Milan
openaire   +4 more sources

Pure Nash Equilibria in Bimatrix Games

International Game Theory Review
In this paper, we study the existence of pure Nash equilibria in bimatrix games. Shapley, L. S. [[1964] Some topics in two-person games, in Advances in Game Theory, eds. Dresher, M., Shapley, L. S. & Tucker, A. W. Princeton (University Press, Princeton), pp.
Nagarajan Krishnamurthy, Lina Mallozzi
openaire   +3 more sources

Some of the next articles are maybe not open access.

Related searches:

On Random Symmetric Bimatrix Games

International Game Theory Review, 2020
An experiment was conducted on a sample of [Formula: see text] randomly generated symmetric bimatrix games with size [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text]. Distribution of support sizes and Nash equilibria are used to formulate a conjecture: for finding a symmetric NEP it is enough to check supports up to size [Formula: see text] whereas for ...
Jozsef Abaffy, Ferenc Forgó
openaire   +3 more sources

Hard-to-Solve Bimatrix Games [PDF]

Econometrica, 2006
The Lemke-Howson algorithm is the classical method for finding one Nash equilibrium of a bimatrix game. This paper presents a class of square bimatrix games for which this algorithm takes, even in the best case, an exponential number of steps in the ...
Bernhard von Stengel, Rahul Savani
exaly   +2 more sources

Equilibrium Points of Bimatrix Games

Journal of the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics, 1964
An algebraic proof is given of the existence of equilibrium points for bimatrix (or two-person, non-zero-sum) games. The proof is constructive, leading to an efficient scheme for computing an equilibrium point. In a nondegenerate case, the number of equilibrium points is finite and odd. The proof is valid for any ordered field.
Lemke, C. E., Howson, J. T. jun.
openaire   +4 more sources

Gradients for the evolution of bimatrix games

Journal of Mathematical Biology, 1987
The evolutionary dynamics of bimatrix games is studied for rescaled partnership games and zero sum games. The former case leads to gradient systems. The selection equations for sexual and asexual reproduction of genotypes corresponding to mixed strategies are analysed. As examples, the origin of anisogamy and cyclic chases for predator-prey coevolution
Koth., M., Sigmund, K.
openaire   +5 more sources

On nash subsets of bimatrix games

Naval Research Logistics Quarterly, 1974
AbstractThis work considers a class of bimatrix games to which some well‐known structure theorems of 0‐sum matrix games can be made to generalize. It is additionally shown how to construct such games and how to generate the equilibrium points defining a given game as a member of that class.
openaire   +2 more sources

Incompetence and impact of training in bimatrix games

Automatica, 2012
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Justin D. Beck, Vladimir Ejov, Jerzy A. Filar   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources