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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2022
Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop ...
Haucap, Justus, Heldman, Christina
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Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate for years or even decades. While the literature has presented several determinants of cartel stability, the vast majority focuses on firms as entities, even though cartels are typically formed between individuals who need to develop ...
Haucap, Justus, Heldman, Christina
openaire +3 more sources
International Economic Review, 1986
We define a notion of cartel stability which allows firms to recognize the impact of their actions on the overall market structure. We demonstrate that in an industry with identical firms, linear marginal cost and linear demand conditions, a stable cartel always exists. We determine the characteristics of stable cartels, such as uniqueness and size.
Donsimoni, Marie-Paule +2 more
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We define a notion of cartel stability which allows firms to recognize the impact of their actions on the overall market structure. We demonstrate that in an industry with identical firms, linear marginal cost and linear demand conditions, a stable cartel always exists. We determine the characteristics of stable cartels, such as uniqueness and size.
Donsimoni, Marie-Paule +2 more
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Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1993
This paper formalizes and studies the argument of cartelization of industries through captured agencies. An agency can affect entry by a producer of a differentiated commodity in the market of a regulated natural monopoly through the manipulation of information it produces about the benefit of entry.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Tirole, Jean
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This paper formalizes and studies the argument of cartelization of industries through captured agencies. An agency can affect entry by a producer of a differentiated commodity in the market of a regulated natural monopoly through the manipulation of information it produces about the benefit of entry.
Laffont, Jean-Jacques, Tirole, Jean
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2015
Abstract The chapter discusses the constituent elements of a cartel, which are agreements or concerted practices between competitors aimed at certain restrictions of competition by object, such as price fixing or market sharing. It then turns to two interrelated topics, namely the burden and standard of proof in cartel investigations ...
Filip Tuytschaever +1 more
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Abstract The chapter discusses the constituent elements of a cartel, which are agreements or concerted practices between competitors aimed at certain restrictions of competition by object, such as price fixing or market sharing. It then turns to two interrelated topics, namely the burden and standard of proof in cartel investigations ...
Filip Tuytschaever +1 more
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2021
We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting.
Burguet, Roberto +2 more
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We study the relationship between collusion and corruption in a stylized model of repeated procurement where the cost of reporting corrupt bureaucrats gives rise to a free riding problem. Cooperation among honest suppliers alleviates free-riding in reporting.
Burguet, Roberto +2 more
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German Cartels and Cartel-Like Organizations
2013This chapter focuses on cartels and cartel-like organizations in Nazi Germany. The report explains German industrial organization is dominated by large vertical combines. Cartels and other associations of business, a common fixture of the German economy, have been used by the combines as means for the domination of industry and are
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CAREER DEVELOPMENT AFTER CARTEL PROSECUTION: CARTEL VERSUS NON-CARTEL MANAGERS
Journal of Competition Law and Economics, 2012I examine the career development of managers after they have been subjected to cartel prosecution by the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa). A representative function is used as an indicator for a career outcome after prosecution. I compare the career development of Dutch managers involved in a cartel with that of a control group of Dutch managers
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, 2005 In reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on collusion, this paper distills methods for detecting cartels and distinguishing collusion from competition.
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