Results 201 to 210 of about 10,250 (292)

Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit

open access: yesInternational Economic Review, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. Low types who do not observe any news may mimic high types by quitting continuously over a phase of time.
Junichiro Ishida, Wing Suen
wiley   +1 more source

Integrated location–inventory planning for slow‐moving demands with waiting time limitations

open access: yesInternational Transactions in Operational Research, EarlyView.
Abstract This paper studies a stochastic facility location problem integrated with inventory and transportation decisions (SFLPIT) for supply chains with slow‐moving stock‐keeping units (SKUs). Local stores often avoid maintaining such SKUs, resulting in customer demand being fulfilled directly by a central distribution center (DC), where the ...
Jie Chu   +4 more
wiley   +1 more source

A spectral analysis extension to DEMATEL for strategic leverage points identification

open access: yesInternational Transactions in Operational Research, EarlyView.
Abstract Efforts to intervene in complex systems often emphasize influential factors, yet system behavior is equally shaped by the relationships among them. Methods such as Decision‐Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) map causal structures but remain descriptive and do not identify which relationships provide the greatest leverage for ...
Pavlos Delias, Kerasia Kalkitsa
wiley   +1 more source

An Information Theoretic Condition for Perfect Reconstruction. [PDF]

open access: yesEntropy (Basel)
Delsol I   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Market Shares as a Collusive Marker: Evidence From the European Truck Industry

open access: yesJournal of Economics &Management Strategy, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Collusion theory robustly predicts non‐cartel rivals will raise their prices and increase their output. As a typical cartel cuts back production, its competitors are expected to gain market share during the collusive period and to lose market share in the period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by
Andreas Bovin, Iwan Bos
wiley   +1 more source

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