Dynamic pricing strategies towards strategic consumers under demand learning. [PDF]
Tang M, Tian J, Kong J, Ren Z, Tian J.
europepmc +1 more source
Signaling Vision: Knowing When to Quit
ABSTRACT We study a signaling game where agents signal their type by choosing when to quit pursuing an uncertain project. High types observe news about project quality and quit when bad news arrives. Low types who do not observe any news may mimic high types by quitting continuously over a phase of time.
Junichiro Ishida, Wing Suen
wiley +1 more source
Reconstruction of Multiple Strings of Constant Weight from Prefix-Suffix Compositions. [PDF]
Yang Y, Chen Z.
europepmc +1 more source
An algebraic approach to circulant column parity mixers. [PDF]
Subroto RC.
europepmc +1 more source
Integrated location–inventory planning for slow‐moving demands with waiting time limitations
Abstract This paper studies a stochastic facility location problem integrated with inventory and transportation decisions (SFLPIT) for supply chains with slow‐moving stock‐keeping units (SKUs). Local stores often avoid maintaining such SKUs, resulting in customer demand being fulfilled directly by a central distribution center (DC), where the ...
Jie Chu +4 more
wiley +1 more source
A Heteroskedasticity-Robust Overidentifying Restriction Test with High-Dimensional Covariates. [PDF]
Fan Q, Guo Z, Mei Z.
europepmc +1 more source
A spectral analysis extension to DEMATEL for strategic leverage points identification
Abstract Efforts to intervene in complex systems often emphasize influential factors, yet system behavior is equally shaped by the relationships among them. Methods such as Decision‐Making Trial and Evaluation Laboratory (DEMATEL) map causal structures but remain descriptive and do not identify which relationships provide the greatest leverage for ...
Pavlos Delias, Kerasia Kalkitsa
wiley +1 more source
An Information Theoretic Condition for Perfect Reconstruction. [PDF]
Delsol I +4 more
europepmc +1 more source
Market Shares as a Collusive Marker: Evidence From the European Truck Industry
ABSTRACT Collusion theory robustly predicts non‐cartel rivals will raise their prices and increase their output. As a typical cartel cuts back production, its competitors are expected to gain market share during the collusive period and to lose market share in the period following the cartel's demise. We provide empirical support for this prediction by
Andreas Bovin, Iwan Bos
wiley +1 more source
BPKEM: A biometric-based private key encryption and management framework for blockchain. [PDF]
Cai H, Li H, Xu J, Li L, Zhang Y.
europepmc +1 more source

