Results 71 to 80 of about 28,810 (302)
Two-Sided Tacit Collusion: Another Step towards the Role of Demand-Side
Energies, 2017 In the context of agent-based simulation framework of collusion, this paper seeks for two-sided tacit collusion among supply-side and demand-side participants in a constrained network and impacts of this collusion on the market outcomes.
Mehdi Jabbari Zideh +1 more
doaj +1 more source
Strategies and Process of Trade Secret Misappropriation Mitigation: The Case of UK
Strategic Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT Trade Secrets (TS) are vital for innovation‐driven companies, and their loss can inflict significant financial and reputational damage, particularly in the absence of established policies to mitigate misappropriation in the UK. The current academic literature lacks detailed strategies for firms to effectively address these threats.
Oleksandra Ozcan, David Pickernell
wiley +1 more source
On Collusion Sustainability and the Elasticity of Substitution
GamesWe analyze the relationship between collusion sustainability in an infinitely repeated game using trigger strategies and the elasticity of substitution.
Marc Escrihuela-Villar
doaj +1 more source
Strategic Change, EarlyView.ABSTRACT A key challenge in public procurement management is balancing equity and efficiency in government procurement. Based on longitudinal data on more than 120,000 US federal service and construction contracts awarded between 2008 and 2018 across over 500 federal agencies, we examine how agency‐level dynamic capabilities shape the performance of ...
Matilde Cappelletti +3 more
wiley +1 more source
Une critique du mensonge par-delà le bien et le mal
Cahiers d’Études Germaniques, 2014 The article develops a critique of lying in an extra-moral sense and attempts to examine the functions of lying and its categorical condemnation for the individual and society. Starting with a neutral definition of lying, several forms and types of lying
Jochen Mecke
doaj +1 more source
Dynamic Collusion and Collusion Games in Knaster’s Procedure
Czech Economic Review, 2012 In this paper we study the collusion in Knaster’s procedure, starting from the paper of Fragnelli and Marina (2009). First, we introduce a suitable dynamic mechanism, so that the coalition enlargement is always non-disadvantageous. Then, we define a new class of TU-games in order to evaluate the collusion power of the agents.
BRIATA F, DALL'AGLIO M, FRAGNELLI, Vito
openaire +4 more sources
A Theory of Tacit Collusion [PDF]
A theory of tacit collusion is developed based on coordination through price leadership and less than full mutual understanding of strategies. It is common knowledge that price increases are to be at least matched but who should lead and at what price is
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr.
core
Public Administration and Development, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The reform of public institutions has attracted sustained attention in both scholarship and policymaking. Increasingly, however, there is growing recognition that reforms are rarely implemented in an institutional vacuum. Instead, new reforms are layered onto existing arrangements, producing hybrid institutional landscapes shaped by prior ...
Edidiong Bassey
wiley +1 more source
Collusion under Monitoring of Sales [PDF]
Collusion under imperfect monitoring is explored when firms?prices are private information and their quantities are public information; an information structure consistent with several recent price-fixing cartels such as those in lysine and vitamins. For
Jr Andrzej Skrzypacz +1 more
core
Public Administration and Development, EarlyView.ABSTRACT The lack of a common variable for comparison has been a major obstacle to the development of Comparative Public Administration (CPA). State autonomy enables an integrative contextualization approach, allowing both the analysis of contextual individual country experiences and the generation of generalized comparable knowledge.
Wilson Wong
wiley +1 more source