Results 81 to 90 of about 28,810 (302)

The Optimality of Team Contracts

open access: yesGames, 2013
This paper analyzes optimal contracts in a linear hidden-action model with normally distributed returns possessing two moments that are governed jointly by two agents who have negative exponential utilities.
Mehmet Barlo, Ayça Özdoğan
doaj   +1 more source

Collusion and Research Joint Ventures [PDF]

open access: yes
We examine whether cooperation in R&D leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated-game framework.
Kaz Miyagiwa
core  

Dundee Discussion Papers in Economics 184:Optimal enforcement policies under the threat of collusion and extortion [PDF]

open access: yes, 2005
We consider a model of enforcement where the Principal relies on the Supervisor for information on the Agents. We argue that optimal policies must consider both collusion and extortion possibilities.
Mishra, Ajit
core  

Competition Policy and Achieving Sustainable Development Goal 1 (No Poverty): The Role of Mergers and Acquisitions Adjudications in South Africa

open access: yesSustainable Development, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT South Africa faces persistently high poverty and inequality alongside a highly concentrated economic structure, raising questions about whether merger control, especially public‐interest provisions, can contribute to poverty reduction. However, empirical evidence directly linking merger adjudication outcomes to poverty remains limited.
Nicholas Ngepah   +2 more
wiley   +1 more source

Private Enforcement against Collusion in Mechanism Design [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper brings a new point of view into the theory of collusion-proof mechanism design, which highlights the principle of divide and conquer. We relax the restriction of publicly enforced grand contract in the framework of Laffont-Martimort-Itoh ...
Chen, Zhijun
core  

Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Misconduct: A Review of Empirical Research and Future Research Recommendations

open access: yesSustainable Development, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This study reviews 54 empirical‐quantitative (archival) articles on the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) outcomes and corporate misconduct. Based on the moral licensing and moral track hypotheses, we distinguish between CSR performance, reporting, and assurance on the one hand and between financial and CSR‐related ...
Patrick Velte
wiley   +1 more source

Efficient Collusion in Repeated Auctions with Communication, [PDF]

open access: yes
This paper studies collusion in repeated auctions when bidders communicate prior to each stage auction. The paper presents a folk theorem for independent and correlated private signals and general interdependent values.
Masaki Aoyagi
core  

Collusion and Durability [PDF]

open access: yes, 2008
We develop a model to show that cartels that produce goods with lower durability are easier to sustain implicitly. This observation gen- erates the following results: 1) implicit cartels have an incentive to pro- duce goods with an inefficiently low ...
Strausz, Roland, Sasaki, Dan
core   +1 more source

Stakeholder Governance of the Energy‐Biodiversity Nexus in the Renewable Energy Sector: Pathways to Achieve SDGs in the MENA Region

open access: yesSustainable Development, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT This systematic review examines stakeholder roles in managing biodiversity within renewable‐energy projects across the MENA region, a highly climate‐vulnerable region yet pursuing rapid energy transition toward achieving SDG 7 (Affordable and Clean Energy). The focus is on regulatory bodies and sector companies as primary actors.
Ghada Amin, Nora Adam, Remmer Sassen
wiley   +1 more source

Collusion-resistant cross-chain transaction scheme based on game theory and verifiable consensus

open access: yesTongxin xuebao
Existing cross-chain transaction solutions often overlook the issue of cross-chain collusion. In response, the counter-collusion cross-channel was proposed to facilitate scalable and collusion-resistant cross-chain transactions.
JIA Xuedan, WANG Liangmin, HUANG Longxia
doaj  

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