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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: goldFrontiers in Psychology, 2019
For years, experimental philosophers have attempted to discern whether laypeople find free will compatible with a scientifically deterministic understanding of the universe, yet no consensus has emerged.
Cory J. Clark   +3 more
doaj   +4 more sources

The problem of liberty: The importance of theorizing about classical liberal philosophy in the compatibilism concept formation [PDF]

open access: diamondИзвестия Саратовского университета. Новая серия: Серия Философия. Психология. Педагогика, 2023
Introduction. Modern discussions about free will are reduced to the confrontation between compatibilism and incompatibilism. The desire of the former to connect the free will of the individual with physical conditioning actualizes the problem of ...
Petr P. Lang
doaj   +2 more sources

Compatibilism by degrees [PDF]

open access: diamondBelgrade Philosophical Annual
The usual compatibility debates concerning moral responsibility, determinism and indeterminism tend to be all-or-nothing ("Determinism rules out responsibility!", "Undetermined actions are too lucky to be free!"). The suggestion in this paper is that the
Kearns Stephen
doaj   +2 more sources

Free will and the desire for suicide in mental illness [PDF]

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychiatry, 2022
The desire to die brings about the most radical consequences that can occur in a human life. It therefore requires a high degree of justification. Questions have been raised as to whether this justification can be given in the case of a suicide desire in
Tobias Zürcher, Tobias Zürcher
doaj   +2 more sources

Theological Compatibilism and Essential Properties

open access: diamondNordicum-Mediterraneum, 2008
Alvin Plantinga defends Theological Compatibilism (TC) and Essentialism about property possession (E). TC is the claim that human freedom to act otherwise and God's essential omniscience are compatible, while E is the claim that every individual entity ...
Nicola Ciprotti
doaj   +2 more sources

Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: greenIdeas y Valores, 2009
In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer's semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are
Kevin Timpe
doaj   +4 more sources

Do we have (in)compatibilist intuitions? Surveying experimental research [PDF]

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology
This article critically examines the experimental philosophy of free will, particularly the interplay between ordinary individuals’ compatibilist and incompatibilist intuitions.
Kiichi Inarimori   +4 more
doaj   +2 more sources

Compatibilism and Conscious Will

open access: diamondFilosofie Dnes, 2015
Daniel Dennett’s compatibilism based on redefining free will via broadening the concept of self to include unconscious processes seems to disappoint certain intuitions.
Michaela Košová
doaj   +3 more sources

Free will, determinism, and compatibilism: Blind spots in the theoretical landscape [PDF]

open access: diamondBelgrade Philosophical Annual
Philosophical discourse on 'the' problem of free will has been shaped by three basic options: Libertarianism (accept free will and incompatibility, but deny determinism), hard determinism (accept determinism and incompatibility, but deny free will), and ...
Walter Sven
doaj   +2 more sources

For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures [PDF]

open access: yesFrontiers in Psychology, 2019
Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise
Ivar R. Hannikainen   +44 more
doaj   +2 more sources

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