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Manipulation Cases in Free Will and Moral Responsibility, Part 1: Cases and Arguments. [PDF]

open access: yesPhilos Compass
ABSTRACT A common style of argument in the literature on free will and moral responsibility is the Manipulation Argument. These tend to begin with a case of an agent in a deterministic universe who is manipulated, say, via brain surgery, into performing some action. Intuitively, this agent is not responsible for that action.
De Marco G, Cyr TW.
europepmc   +2 more sources

Humean Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: yesMind, 2002
Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will.
Beebee, H, Mele, A
openaire   +3 more sources

Shepherd on Causal Necessity and Human Agency

open access: yesJournal of Modern Philosophy, 2022
Shepherd defends an account of the universe founded on two causal principles: that effects necessarily have causes, and that like causes have like effects.
Louise Daoust
doaj   +4 more sources

Manipulation cases in free will and moral responsibility, part 2: Manipulator-focused responses. [PDF]

open access: yesPhilos Compass
Abstract In this paper—Part 2 of 3—we discuss one of the two main types of soft‐line responses to manipulation cases, which we refer to as manipulator‐focused views. Manipulator‐focused views hold, roughly, that the reason that Victim lacks responsibility (or lacks full responsibility) is because of the way the action is related to the Manipulator ...
De Marco G, Cyr TW.
europepmc   +2 more sources

Free Will and the Future of Humanity [PDF]

open access: yesFuture Human Image, 2020
This article presents the author’s attempt to analyze the argument “manipulation” versus “free will” by the philosopher Derk Pereboom. To demonstrate his position, Pereboom uses the “thought experiment” method, popular in analytical philosophy, and cites
Ruslan Myronenko
doaj   +1 more source

Physicalism and moral responsibility: presentation of derivative consequence argument [PDF]

open access: yesОмский научный вестник: Серия "Общество. История. Современность", 2020
In this paper, the author introduces the derivative consequence argument, which aims to demonstrate that moral responsibility is impossible in the world where physicalism and the strong realism about the laws of nature are both true.
B. V. Faul
doaj   +1 more source

Demotivating Semi-Compatibilism [PDF]

open access: yesIdeas y Valores, 2009
In this paper, I explore some of the motivations behind John Martin Fischer's semi-compatibilism. Particularly, I look at three reasons Fischer gives for preferring semi-compatibilism to libertarianism. I argue that the first two of these motivations are
Kevin Timpe
doaj   +3 more sources

DRETSKE ON METAPHYSICS AND FREEDOM; pp. 173–178 [PDF]

open access: yesTrames, 2009
In this paper, Fred Dretske’s component theory of action is evaluated. Dretske claims that in his theory reasons are parts or components of action. Thus, reasons do not cause actions because a part cannot cause the whole whose part it is.
Olli Koistinen
doaj   +1 more source

On Flew’s Compatibilism and His Objections to Theistic Libertarianism [PDF]

open access: yes, 2015
Flew strongly defends a compatibilist thesis in the free will debate before going on to totally object to theistic libertarianism. His objections basically rely on his compatibilism embracing the notion of agent causation, which is not very common in ...
Gundogdu, Hakan
core   +1 more source

Compatibilism by degrees [PDF]

open access: yesBelgrade Philosophical Annual
The usual compatibility debates concerning moral responsibility, determinism and indeterminism tend to be all-or-nothing ("Determinism rules out responsibility!", "Undetermined actions are too lucky to be free!"). The suggestion in this paper is that the
Kearns Stephen
doaj   +1 more source

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