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On the Conditions of the Syllogism

1992
187. The syllogism, as Aristotle defined it, is an [argument]a such that, when more than one sentences are combined, something else follows from them of necessity, and not by accident. From this definition we know that what follows from the conversionb of a sentence is not a syllogistic consequence, since there is only one sentence, albeit something ...
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On the Syllogisms Compounded of Predicative and Conditional Propositions

1973
In these syllogisms the predicative proposition is either the major or the minor premiss. Also, the predicative premiss shares [either its subject or its predicate] with [part of] the consequent or the antecedent (of the conditional premiss).
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On the Conditions of Syllogisms with Modes, Particles, and Retracted Terms

1992
283. It is clear from the preceding that if the middle term, or either or both of the extremes, is a retracted term then the syllogism will yield in each of the moods of the various figures in the manner that the combination with simple terms yields. This may become clear through the same explanation that was offered there.
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On the Syllogisms Compounded of Connective-Conditional Propositions Arranged in Three Figures

1973
The syllogisms compounded of connective propositions are syllogisms whose premisses share one of their parts (tashtarikāni fī ḥadd)1: the antecedent or the consequent. This combination takes the form of the three figures described in connection with predicative syllogisms.
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On the Enumeration of the Exceptive Syllogisms [Which have a Separative Conditional Premiss]

1973
The exceptive syllogism which is compounded of conditional premisses that express a real separative proposition can either have two or more than two parts. Those which have two parts may have one affirmative and one negative parts, namely contradictory parts—as when we say ‘Either so or not-so’. If we except [i.e. assert] any one of them we produce the
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Toward Adequacy Conditions for Inference Schemata in Approximate Reasoning: The Case of the Rule of Syllogism

1999
In the field of approximate reasoning a series of quite plausible inference schemata for approximate inferences have been proposed, e.g. generalisations of standard syllogisms of classical logic in [Zadeh, 1984; Zadeh, 1985], cf. also [Lopez de Mantaras, 19901, and there has been argued for their acceptability—but essentially only on a heuristic ...
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