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Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes [PDF]
Public Choice, 2016 The goal of this paper is to propose a comparison of four multi-winner voting rules, k-Plurality, k-Negative Plurality, k-Borda, and Bloc, which can be considered as generalisations of well-known single-winner scoring rules. The first comparison is based
Diss, Mostapha, Doghmi, Ahmed
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Split Cycle: A New Condorcet Consistent Voting Method Independent of Clones and Immune to Spoilers [PDF]
Public Choice, 2021 We propose a Condorcet consistent voting method that we call Split Cycle. Split Cycle belongs to the small family of known voting methods that significantly narrow the choice of winners in the presence of majority cycles while also satisfying ...
Holliday, Wesley H., Pacuit, Eric
core +5 more sources
Positional rules and q-Condorcet consistency [PDF]
Review of Economic Design, 2015 A well-known result in Social Choice theory is the following: every scoring rule (positional rules) violates Condorcet consistency. A rule is Condorcet consistent when it selects the alternative that is preferred to every other alternative by a majority of individuals. In this paper, we investigate some limits of this negative result.
Courtin, Sébastien +2 more
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Reducing the Computational Time for the Kemeny Method by Exploiting Condorcet Properties
Mathematics, 2021 Preference aggregation and in particular ranking aggregation are mainly studied by the field of social choice theory but extensively applied in a variety of contexts.
Noelia Rico +3 more
doaj +3 more sources
A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle [PDF]
SIAM Journal on Applied Mathematics, 1978 Condorcet's principle of choosing the majority alternative whenever one exists is violated not only by Borda's rule but also by any scoring method; nevertheless, the essential property of scoring functions -- "consistency" of the outcome under aggregation of subgroups -- is shown to be compatible with Condorcet's principle.
Young, H. P., Levenglick, A.
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Condorcet Consistency and the strong no show paradoxes [PDF]
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2019 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Kasper, Laura +2 more
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A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter [PDF]
, 2011 We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it ...
Buechel, Berno
core +6 more sources
Complete integrability of information processing by biochemical reactions. [PDF]
Sci Rep, 2016 Statistical mechanics provides an effective framework to investigate information processing in biochemical reactions. Within such framework far-reaching analogies are established among (anti-) cooperative collective behaviors in chemical kinetics, (anti-)
Agliari E +3 more
europepmc +5 more sources
Condorcet consistent scoring rules and single-peakedness [PDF]
Economics Letters, 2019 We study voting problems with an odd number of agents and single-peaked preferences. With only three alternatives, there are scoring rules that yield the Condorcet winner only for committees of three and five agents. With four or more alternatives, only committees of three agents work.
Berga, Dolors +2 more
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Rationalizations of Condorcet-consistent rules via distances of hamming type [PDF]
Social Choice and Welfare, 2011 The main idea of the {\em distance rationalizability} approach to view the voters' preferences as an imperfect approximation to some kind of consensus is deeply rooted in social choice literature. It allows one to define ("rationalize") voting rules via a consensus class of elections and a distance: a candidate is said to be an election winner if she ...
Elkind, Edith +2 more
openaire +3 more sources