Results 11 to 20 of about 4,179 (137)

CONDORCET CONSISTENCY AND PAIRWISE JUSTIFIABILITY UNDER VARIABLE AGENDAS

International Economic Review
AbstractWe compare the consequences of imposing upon collective choice functions the classical requirement of Condorcet consistency with those arising when requiring the functions to satisfy the principle of pairwise justifiability. We show that, despite the different logic underlying these two requirements, they are equivalent when applied to ...
Barberà, Salvador, Berga, Dolors, Moreno, Bernardo, Nicolo, Antonio   +3 more
exaly   +10 more sources

Condorcet Consistency of Approval Voting: a Counter Example in Large Poisson Games [PDF]

Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2010
Approval Voting is analyzed in a context of large elections with strategic voters: the Myerson’s Large Poisson Games. We first establish the Magnitude Equivalence Theorem which substantially reduces the complexity of computing the magnitudes of the pivot outcomes. Furthermore, we show that the Condorcet Winner need not be the Winner of the election in
Matias Nunez
openaire   +4 more sources

Trends and Directions of Preference Elicitation and Assessment in Food Science: Single-, Pair-, and Multi-Criteria Ranking Methods. [PDF]

Food Sci Nutr
The advantages and limitations of standard ranking techniques are evaluated. Related methodologies from other disciplines have the potential to sensory studies. International food competition rules are heterogeneous and insufficiently specified. Guidance for future research directions in decision methodologies is provided.
Sipos L, Galambosi Z, Biró P, Csató L, Bozóki S.   +4 more
europepmc   +2 more sources

Set-Monotonicity Implies Kelly-Strategyproofness [PDF]

, 2014
This paper studies the strategic manipulation of set-valued social choice functions according to Kelly's preference extension, which prescribes that one set of alternatives is preferred to another if and only if all elements of the former are preferred ...
Brandt, Felix
core   +1 more source

An axiomatic derivation of Condorcet-consistent social decision rules

, 2021
A social decision rule (SDR) is any non-empty set-valued map that associates any profile of individual preferences with the set of (winning) alternatives. An SDR is Condorcet-consistent if it selects the set of Condorcet winners whenever this later is non-empty. We propose a characterization of Condorcet consistent SDRs with a set of minimal axioms. It
Yonta, Aurelien Mekuko, Núñez, Matias, Moyouwou, Issofa, Andjiga, Nicolas Gabriel   +3 more
openaire   +2 more sources

The Pareto Frontier for Random Mechanisms [PDF]

, 2016
We study the trade-offs between strategyproofness and other desiderata, such as efficiency or fairness, that often arise in the design of random ordinal mechanisms.
Mennle, Timo, Seuken, Sven
core   +1 more source

Set-Rationalizable Choice and Self-Stability

, 2009
A common assumption in modern microeconomic theory is that choice should be rationalizable via a binary preference relation, which \citeauthor{Sen71a} showed to be equivalent to two consistency conditions, namely $\alpha$ (contraction) and $\gamma ...
Aizerman, Aizerman, Allingham, Arlegi, Arrow, Arrow, Austen-Smith, Banks, Barberà, Blair, Blau, Bordes, Bordes, Bordes, Brandt, Campbell, Chernoff, Dutta, Dutta, Felix Brandt, Fishburn, Herzberger, Kelly, Laffond, Laffond, Laslier, Mas-Colell, Miller, Moulin, Moulin, Moulin, Paul Harrenstein, Plott, Richter, Samuelson, Schwartz, Schwartz, Schwartz, Schwartz, Sen, Sen, Sen, Sen, Sen, Sen, Taylor, von Neumann   +46 more
core   +4 more sources

Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates

Games and Economic Behavior
24 pages, 4 ...
Felix Brandt, Chris Dong, Dominik Peters
openaire   +2 more sources

Condorcet-Consistent and Approximately Strategyproof Tournament Rules

, 2016
20 ...
Schneider, Jon, Schvartzman, Ariel, Weinberg, S. Matthew   +2 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Relaxed notions of Condorcet-consistency and efficiency for strategyproof social decision schemes [PDF]

Social Choice and Welfare
AbstractSocial decision schemes (SDSs) map the preferences of a group of voters over some set of m alternatives to a probability distribution over the alternatives. A seminal characterization of strategyproof SDSs by Gibbard (Econometrica 45(3):665–681, 1977) implies that there are no strategyproof Condorcet extensions and that only random ...
Felix Brandt, Patrick Lederer, René Romen   +2 more
openaire   +3 more sources