Results 61 to 70 of about 5,227 (157)
A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter [PDF]
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it ...
Buechel, Berno
core
Condorcet Winners and Anscombe’s Paradox Under Weighted Binary Voting
ISBN:979-8-4007-1426 ...
Baharav, Carmel +2 more
openaire +3 more sources
Asymmetric Partisan Voter Turnout Games. [PDF]
Dyn Games Appl, 2021 Guage C, Fu F.
europepmc +1 more source
ARROW´S IMPOSSIBILITY THEOREM IS NOT SO IMPOSSIBLE AND CONDORCET´S PARADOX IS NOT SO PARADOXICAL: THE ADEQUATE DEFINITION OF A SOCIAL CHOICE PROBLEM [PDF]
In this article, we do two things: first, we present an alternative and simplified proof of the known fact that cardinal individual utility functions are necessary, but not sufficient, and that interpersonal comparability is sufficient, but not necessary,
Daniel Castellanos
core
Clustering and mapping the first COVID-19 outbreak in France. [PDF]
BMC Public Health, 2022 Darques R +3 more
europepmc +1 more source
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and ...
Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki
core
A Gesture Elicitation Study of Nose-Based Gestures. [PDF]
Sensors (Basel), 2020 Pérez-Medina JL +2 more
europepmc +1 more source
Condorcet domains and distributive lattices [PDF]
Condorcet domains are sets of linear orders where Condorcet's effect can never occur. Works of Abello, Chameni-Nembua, Fishburn and Galambos and Reiner have allowed a strong understanding of a significant class of Condorcet domains which are distributive
Bernard Monjardet
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Election by Majority Judgement: Experimental Evidence [PDF]
Le jugement majoritaire est une méthode d'élection. Cette méthode est l'aboutissement d'une nouvelle théorie du choix social où les électeurs jugent les candidats au lieu de les ranger. La théorie est développée dans d'autres publications ([2, 4]).
Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki
core