Results 51 to 60 of about 336 (165)

Savoir scolaire et élémentarité chez Condorcet

open access: yes, 1995
In this article, we introduce the role of elementary academic knowledge in Condorcet’s theory of state education. Elementary knowledge comes from both a scientific and a didactic transposition.
Coutel, Charles
core   +1 more source

Condorcet Methods - When, Why and How? [PDF]

open access: yes
Geometric representations of 3-candidate profiles are used to investigate properties of preferential election methods. The representation visualizes both the possibility to win by agenda manipulation, i.e.
Stensholt, Eivind
core  

Judge:Don't Vote! [PDF]

open access: yes
This article explains why the traditional model of the theory of social choice misrepresents reality, it cannot lead to acceptable methods of ranking and electing in any case, and a more realistic model leads inevitably to one method of ranking and ...
Michel Balinski, Rida Laraki
core  

Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting [PDF]

open access: yes
An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly.
Kevin Roberts
core  

Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting.

open access: yes, 2007
An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly.
Roberts, Kevin
core   +1 more source

The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet

open access: yes, 2017
Among all existing paradoxes of voting, the one pointed out by Condorcet has managed to become known as 'the' voting paradox. This relevant paradox states that the transitivity of the voters' preferences does not imply the transitivity of the collective ...
Raúl Pérez-Fernández   +3 more
core   +1 more source

The Condorcet Paradox Revisited

open access: yes
We analyze the simplest Condorcet cycle with three players and three alternatives within a strategic bargaining model with recognition probabilities and costless delay.
Harold Houba, P. Jean-Jacques Herings
core  

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