Results 31 to 40 of about 336 (165)
Sociologie Românească, 2011 In social life, people try to know, to build, to maintain, to change, to destroy and to avoid hierarchies. At the social level, the hierarchical systems are considered to be desirable for their capacity to increase efficiency, communication and control ...
Cătălin Mamali, Gheorghe Păun
doaj
A risky challenge for intransitive preferences
Noûs, Volume 58, Issue 2, Page 360-385, June 2024.Abstract Philosophers have spent a great deal of time debating whether intransitive preferences can be rational. I present a risky decision that poses a challenge for the defender of intransitivity. The defender of intransitivity faces a trilemma and must either: (i) reject the rationality of intransitive preferences, (ii) deny State‐wise Dominance, or
Timothy Luke Williamson
wiley +1 more source
A natural adaptive process for collective decision‐making
Theoretical Economics, Volume 19, Issue 2, Page 667-703, May 2024.Consider an urn filled with balls, each labeled with one of several possible collective decisions. Now let a random voter draw two balls from the urn and pick her more preferred as the collective decision. Relabel the losing ball with the collective decision, put both balls back into the urn, and repeat.
Florian Brandl, Felix Brandt
wiley +1 more source
State of the Field: Histories of the Future
History, Volume 109, Issue 384-385, Page 150-172, April 2024.Abstract In the last decade, future thinking has rapidly gained importance as a topic of historical study. This article provides an overview of the existing historiographies of future thinking as well as the actions and practices that follow such thoughts.
Jeroen Puttevils +5 more
wiley +1 more source
A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem [PDF]
Advances in Applied Mathematics, 2002 A social choice function is rational if it is an order on the alternatives; it is symmetric if the choice is invariant under some transitive group of permutations of the voters (not necessarily all permutations). The main result of the paper is that, as the number of voters tends to infinity, the probability that a symmetric social choice function on ...
openaire +1 more source
A generalized Hotelling–Downs model with asymmetric candidates
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 26, Issue 1, February 2024.Abstract We investigate an extension of the Hotelling–Downs model to the case where the preferences of the voters do not have to be single peaked. In the case where candidates only care about winning or losing, assuming that a voter elects each candidate symmetrically with equal probability when indifferent, previous works by Fisher and Ryan and by ...
Elham Nikram, Dieter Balkenborg
wiley +1 more source
Journal of Public Economic Theory, Volume 26, Issue 1, February 2024.Abstract We take an axiomatic approach to study redistribution problems when agents report income and needs. We formalize axioms reflecting ethical and operational principles such as additivity, impartiality and individual rationality. Different combinations of those axioms characterize three focal rules (laissez faire, full redistribution, and need ...
Ricardo Martínez +1 more
wiley +1 more source
Condorcet domains on at most seven alternatives [PDF]
A Condorcet domain is a collection of linear orders which avoid Condorcet's paradox for majority voting. We have developed a new algorithm for complete enumeration of all maximal Condorcet domains and, using a supercomputer, obtained the first ...
Akello-Egwel, D +4 more
core +1 more source
Manifesting the revolutionary people: The Yellow Vest Movement and popular sovereignty
Constellations, Volume 31, Issue 4, Page 640-660, December 2024.
Samuel Hayat
wiley +1 more source
Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective
Kyklos, Volume 77, Issue 1, Page 3-21, February 2024.Abstract This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily.
Roger D. Congleton
wiley +1 more source