Results 51 to 60 of about 4,335 (155)
The Ranking Problem of Alternatives as a Cooperative Game
This paper considers the ranking problem of candidates for a certain position based on ballot papers filled by voters. We suggest a ranking procedure of alternatives using cooperative game theory methods.
Kondratev, Aleksei, Mazalov, Vladimir
core +1 more source
A note on Condorcet consistency and the median voter [PDF]
We discuss to which extent the median voter theorem extends to the domain of single-peaked preferences on median spaces. After observing that on this domain a Condorcet winner need not exist, we show that if a Condorcet winner does exist, then it ...
Buechel, Berno
core
Correction to: When are committees of Condorcet winners Condorcet winning committees? [PDF]
Aslan, Fatma +2 more
openaire +2 more sources
Trading and Shareholder Democracy
ABSTRACT We study shareholder voting in a model in which trading affects the composition of the shareholder base. Trading and voting are complementary, which gives rise to selfâfulfilling expectations about proposal acceptance and multiple equilibria. Prices and shareholder welfare can move in opposite directions, so the former may be an invalid proxy ...
DORON LEVIT, NADYA MALENKO, ERNST MAUG
wiley +1 more source
Condorcet Cycles? A Model of Intertemporal Voting [PDF]
An intertemporal voting model is examined where, at each date, there is a pairwise majority vote between the existing chosen state and some other state, chosen randomly.
Kevin Roberts
core
Analysis of Voting procedures in One-Seat Elections: Condorcet Efficiency and Borda Efficiency [PDF]
In this paper 16 different voting procedures for one-seat elections are analysed: the rules of Borda, Condorcet, Black, Copeland, Simpson, Hare, Coombs, Baldwin, Nanson and the plurality, anti-plurality, majority, approval and runoff rules.
Dimitri Vandercruyssen
core
Deliberative Democracy and Incompatibilities of Choice Norms. [PDF]
Nurmi H.
europepmc +1 more source
Combining Voting Rules Together [PDF]
We propose a simple method for combining together voting rules that performs a run-off between the different winners of each voting rule. We prove that this combinator has several good properties.
Narodytska, Nina +2 more
core +1 more source
Computations of volumes in five candidates elections. [PDF]
Bruns W, Ichim B.
europepmc +1 more source
Maximum Likelihood Approach to Vote Aggregation with Variable Probabilities [PDF]
Condorcet (1785) initiated the statistical approach to vote aggregation. Two centuries later, Young (1988) showed that a correct application of the maximum likelihood principle leads to the selection of rankings called Kemeny orders, which have the ...
Drissi, Mohamed, Truchon, Michel
core

