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Stochastic Game Theoretic trajectory optimization in continuous time

2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control (CDC), 2016
A Stochastic Game Theoretic Differential Dynamic Programming (SGT-DDP) algorithm is derived to solve a differential game under stochastic dynamics. We present the update law for the minimizing and maximizing controls for both players and provide a set of backward differential equations for the second order value function approximation.
Wei Sun   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source

A Stackelberg equilibrium for continuous-time differential games

The 22nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, 1983
The paper is concerned with the construction of Stackelberg strategies for differential continous-time leader-follower games, where the leader has access to the closed-loop information. The proposed approach utilizes the methodology of sequential strategies, developed originally for the zero-sum differential games, to derive a method for computing the ...
openaire   +1 more source

Robust Lyapunov Games: The Continuous-Time Case

1991
This paper extends the robust Lyapunov stabilization approach developed by Leitmann and co-workers to continuous-time, uncertain two-players games. The games are uncertain in the following sense. None of the players knows exactly the constraints facing it or its opponent. Possibly, even the opponent’s strategies are unknown.
openaire   +1 more source

Continuous-Time Mean-Field-Type Games

2021
Julian Barreiro-Gomez, Hamidou Tembine
openaire   +1 more source

Reinforcement Learning and Adaptive Optimal Control for Continuous-Time Nonlinear Systems: A Value Iteration Approach

IEEE Transactions on Neural Networks and Learning Systems, 2022
Tao Bian, Zhong-Ping Jiang
exaly  

Games with continuous-time experimental protocols

2020
Alexander L. Brown, Daniel G. Stephenson
openaire   +1 more source

Multi-stage game theroy in continuous time

2006
I define multi-stage stochastic games in continuous time. As in Bergin and MacLeod (1993), strategies have infinitesimal inertia, i.e., agents cannot change their strategies in an infinitesimal interval immediately after each time t. I extend the framework to allow for mixed strategies.
openaire   +1 more source

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