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Contract Cheating Research: Implications for Canadian Universities

, 2019
Slides from the opening keynote address of the Canadian Symposium on Academic Integrity, held at the University of Calgary, April 17-18, 2019. In this session, Dr. Tracey Bretag shared recent research on contract cheating, and discussed the implications of the findings for Canadian educational contexts.
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Mixed Strategies in Simultaneous and Sequential Play of a 2 Player Game [PDF]

We take a class of games with two players and two actions which only have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. We show that such games can only have hybrid equilibria if played sequentially with one player moving first. The hybrid equilibrium has the leader p
Peter Simmons
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Rules, Communication and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case [PDF]

Detailed notes on weekly meetings of the sugar refining cartel show how communication helps firms collude, and so highlight the deficiencies in the current formal theory of collusion. The Sugar Institute did not fix prices or output.
David Genesove, Wallace P. Mullin
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How Community Institutions Create Economic Advantage: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York [PDF]

, 2006
This paper argues that Jewish merchants have historically dominated the diamond industry because of their ability to reliably implement diamond credit sales.
Richman, Barak D.
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Does Top of the Market Pricing Facilitate Oligopsony Coordination? [PDF]

This paper suggests how a particular vertical arrangement, Top of the Market Pricing (TOMP), can have horizontal anti-competitive effects. The theory is also applicable to other vertical arrangements in use in the fed cattle market.
David E. Davis
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An Economic Analysis of the Potential for Coercion in Consent Solicitations for Bonds [PDF]

, 1994
This Article examines why issuers frequently cannot present bondholders with an offer that draws on collective action problems to force the acceptance of the offer by the bondholders. The analysis is restricted to publicly offered bonds.
Barondes, Royce de R.
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Project Financing when the Principal Cannot Commit [PDF]

Suppose an entrepreneur needs funds from a financier to invest in a risky project whose cost is fixed, and whose return may be high or low. Suppose also that the project's realized return is an information that is private to the entrepreneur.
M. Martin Boyer
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Corruption under moral hazard [PDF]

In this theoretical analysis, the"principal"can be the head of the tax collection agency (or"government"or even citizens), the"supervisor"can be the tax collector, and the"agent"can be the taxpayer.
Eskeland, Gunnar S., Thiele, Henrik
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On Corruption and Institutions in Decentralised Economies [PDF]

This paper studies opportunistic behaviour in a model of decentralised economic exchange and inadequate institutional framework of formal contract enforcement.
Andrianova, Svetlana
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Community Enforcement of Informal Contracts: Jewish Diamond Merchants in New York [PDF]

, 2002
The diamond industry is home to many unusual features: the predominance of an ethnically homogeneous community of merchants, the norm of intergenerational family businesses, and a rejection of public courts in favor of private contract enforcement.
Richman, Barak D.
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