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Unlocking Circular Economy Potentials: Testing the Moderating and Mediating Roles of Cultural Diversity, Technological Innovation, and Digitalization

Business Strategy and the Environment, EarlyView.
ABSTRACT Green finance (GF) has emerged as a key policy instrument for advancing the circular economy (CE), yet its impact varies considerably across OECD countries. Existing research has not sufficiently examined how institutional, technological, and cultural contexts shape this relationship.
Mohammed Ibrahim Gariba, Solomon Gyamfi, Viktor Prokop, Jan Stejskal, Vikas Kumar, Cali Nuur   +5 more
wiley   +1 more source

Adolescents infer latent motives to build generalizable models of others' behavior. [PDF]

iScience
Vigil-Escalera J, van Baar J, Molleman L, van Duijvenvoorde ACK, Ma I.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Temporality modulates the effect of network heterogeneity on cooperation fixation. [PDF]

Nat Commun
Li A, Meng Y, Zhou L, Masuda N, Wang L.
europepmc   +1 more source

LLM agents overcome the machine penalty when acting fairly but not when acting selfishly or altruistically. [PDF]

Natl Sci Rev
Wang Z, Song R, Shen C, Yin S, Song Z, Battu B, Shi L, Jia D, Rahwan T, Hu S.   +9 more
europepmc   +1 more source

A game-based approach to teaching net and wall games in physical education teacher education. [PDF]

Front Sports Act Living
Poncet-Rief M, Rode D.
europepmc   +1 more source

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Cooperative Fuzzy Games

Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981
We derive versions of known results dealing with core, equilibria and Shapley-values of cooperative games in the case of cooperative fuzzy games, i.e., games defined on fuzzy subsets of the set of n players. A fuzzy coalition is an n-vector τ = (τi) associating with each player i his “rate of participation” τi ∈ [0, 1] in the fuzzy coalition and the ...
Jean-Pierre Aubin
exaly   +4 more sources

The selectope for cooperative games [PDF]

International Journal of Game Theory, 2000
The authors investigate the distribution of payoff within a coalition. As usual, a cooperative game is defined by the value function on coalitions. A set of distributions is constructed in the following way. The difference of the value of a coalition and the summarized value of all its sub-coalitions forms the dividend of Harsanyi.
Jean Derks, Hans Haller, Hans Peters 0001   +2 more
openaire   +1 more source