Results 271 to 280 of about 27,014 (309)
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Mathematics of Operations Research, 1981
We derive versions of known results dealing with core, equilibria and Shapley-values of cooperative games in the case of cooperative fuzzy games, i.e., games defined on fuzzy subsets of the set of n players. A fuzzy coalition is an n-vector τ = (τi) associating with each player i his “rate of participation” τi ∈ [0, 1] in the fuzzy coalition and the ...
exaly +3 more sources
We derive versions of known results dealing with core, equilibria and Shapley-values of cooperative games in the case of cooperative fuzzy games, i.e., games defined on fuzzy subsets of the set of n players. A fuzzy coalition is an n-vector τ = (τi) associating with each player i his “rate of participation” τi ∈ [0, 1] in the fuzzy coalition and the ...
exaly +3 more sources
The selectope for cooperative games [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2000 The authors investigate the distribution of payoff within a coalition. As usual, a cooperative game is defined by the value function on coalitions. A set of distributions is constructed in the following way. The difference of the value of a coalition and the summarized value of all its sub-coalitions forms the dividend of Harsanyi.
Jean Derks +2 more
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International Game Theory Review, 2000
We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation
Jerzy A. Filar, Leon A. Petrosjan
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We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation
Jerzy A. Filar, Leon A. Petrosjan
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Journal of Combinatorial Optimization, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Qizhi Fang +3 more
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Qizhi Fang +3 more
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The Annals of Mathematics, 1951
Gegenüber den bisherigen Betrachtungen werden Spiele zwischen \(n\) Spielern nicht unter Berücksichtigung ihrer möglichen Kooperationen, sondern ohne jede solche betrachtet. Dies führt zu folgender Verallgemeinerung der Lösung von Zwei-Personen-Spielen mit insgesamt Nullgewinn. Man betrachte bei jedem Spieler seine mit den Koeffizienten \(c_{i\alpha }\)
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Gegenüber den bisherigen Betrachtungen werden Spiele zwischen \(n\) Spielern nicht unter Berücksichtigung ihrer möglichen Kooperationen, sondern ohne jede solche betrachtet. Dies führt zu folgender Verallgemeinerung der Lösung von Zwei-Personen-Spielen mit insgesamt Nullgewinn. Man betrachte bei jedem Spieler seine mit den Koeffizienten \(c_{i\alpha }\)
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On the computation of the nucleolus of a cooperative game [PDF]
International Journal of Game Theory, 2001 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Jeroen Kuipers +2 more
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Mathematical Social Sciences, 2018
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems, 2008
We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent's primary aim is to achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean variables.
Paul E. Dunne +3 more
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We present and formally investigate Cooperative Boolean Games, a new, natural family of coalitional games that are both compact and expressive. In such a game, an agent's primary aim is to achieve its individual goal, which is represented as a propositional logic formula over some set of Boolean variables.
Paul E. Dunne +3 more
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