Results 191 to 200 of about 1,599 (224)

Semantics for Pollock’s Defeasible Reasoning

1999
Many researchers have proposed argumentation-based reasoning as a viable alternative to reasoning systems with a flat epistemological structure. Perhaps one of the longest standing approaches heis been in the Oscar project, led by John Pollock. Unfortunately, without a formal semaintics, it is often difficult to evaluate the various incarnations of ...
Quoc Bao Vo, Joe Thurbon
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Semantics for a theory of defeasible reasoning

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 2005
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Vo, Quoc Bao, Foo, Norman Y., Thurbon, Joe   +2 more
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Reasons for Action and Defeasibility*

2012
The main purpose of this essay is to answer a very general question that may be posed in the following terms: can reasons for action be defeasible? Any position regarding this issue will entirely depend on how the terms under consideration are understood.
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Formalizing perspectival defeasible reasoning

Proceedings of the Thirtieth Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences, 2002
I provide a unique formalism for defeasible reasoning that takes into account how an agent activates a perspective in response to a situation in which reasoning using a concept is called for, how each perspective is organized, and how the contents of each activated perspective is related to the contents of other perspectives.
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Defeasible Reasoning with e-Contracts

2006 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, 2006
We propose a mapping from a contract representation in Event Calculus to Default Logic. The resulting representation allows for defeasible reasoning with e-contracts, which is useful in order to determine the normative state of a business exchange in the presence of incomplete or inaccurate knowledge. More importantly, we may use this representation in
Georgios K. Giannikis, Aspassia Daskalopulu   +1 more
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The epistemic basis of defeasible reasoning

Minds and Machines, 1991
This article argues that: (i) Defeasible reasoning is the use of distinctive procedures for belief revision when new evidence or new authoritative judgment is interpolated into a system of beliefs about an application domain. (ii) These procedures can be explicated and implemented using standard higher-order logic combined with epistemic assumptions ...
exaly   +2 more sources

Heuristics, justification, and defeasible reasoning

Minds and Machines, 1995
Heuristics can be regarded as justifying the actions and beliefs of problem-solving agents. I use an analysis of heuristics to argue that a symbiotic relationship exists between traditional epistemology and contemporary artificial intelligence. On one hand, the study of models of problem-solving agents usingquantitative heuristics, for example computer
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Euler Diagrams for Defeasible Reasoning

2020
We investigate Euler diagrammatic systems for defeasible reasoning by extending the usual systems for Euler and Venn diagrams corresponding to standard classical logic. To achieve this, we use the generalized quantifier “most” to formalize defeasible reasoning, as proposed by Schlechta (1995), where defeasible knowledge is represented as “Most A are B”
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Defeasible reasoning and logic programming

Minds and Machines, 1991
The general conditions of epistemic defeat are naturally represented through the interplay of two distinct kinds of entailment, deductive and defeasible. Many of the current approaches to modeling defeasible reasoning seek to define defeasible entailment via model-theoretic notions like truth and satisfiability, which, I argue, fails to capture this ...
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The Feasibility of Defeat in Defeasible Reasoning

1993
Reasoning beyond the information enclosed in the premises is a tempting but risky activity. It is tempting, because sheer deductive reasoning brings us no more than what was already recorded in the premises. And it is risky, because we might jump to the wrong conclusions. This is, very briefly, the issue of ampliative inference mechanisms.
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