Results 51 to 60 of about 1,599 (224)
Agnosticism about artificial consciousness
Could an AI have conscious experiences? Answers to this question should be based not on intuition, dogma or speculation but on solid scientific evidence. However, I argue such evidence is hard to come by and that the only justifiable stance is agnosticism.
Tom McClelland
wiley +1 more source
Abstract The present paper presents a new (formal) theory of presence according to which, roughly, to be present at a place is to have a delegate located at that place. One crucial feature of the theory is that something can be present at a place without thereby being located there.
Claudio Calosi
wiley +1 more source
Defeasible Reasoning with Prototype Descriptions: First Steps
The representation of defeasible information in Description Logics is a well-known issue and many formal approaches have been proposed, mostly emerging from existing formalisms in non-monotonic logic.
O. Kutz, G. Sacco, L. Bozzato
core
Parallel defeasible argumentation
Implicitly exploitable parallelism for Logic Programming has received ample attention. Defeasible Argutmentation is specially apt for this optimizing technique.
Alejandro Javier García +1 more
doaj
ABSTRACT Conversations can belong to different types, or genres. We consider four dimensions of variation as case studies: Some conversations are about sharing information, others about making decisions; some are about making firm commitments, others about brainstorming options; some are about sticking to the facts, others involve make‐believe; some ...
Elmar Unnsteinsson, Daniel W. Harris
wiley +1 more source
A Dialectical View on Conduction: Reasons, Warrants, and Normal Suasory Inclinations
When Carl Wellman (1971) introduced the reasoning-type conduction, he endorsed a dialectical view on natural language argumentation. Contemporary scholarship, by contrast, treats conductive argument predominantly on a product view. Not only did Wellman’s
Shiyang Yu, Frank Zenker
doaj +1 more source
ABSTRACT Virtue epistemology has long struggled with the “Creditability Dilemma”: how can knowledge gained through deference be creditable to the knower if it primarily depends on others’ cognitive work? We propose a novel solution by developing a telic account of doxastic deference as a distinctive kind of social‐epistemic performance.
J. Adam Carter, Jesper Kallestrup
wiley +1 more source
Imaging Deductive Reasoning and the New Paradigm
There has been a great expansion of research into human reasoning at all of Marr’s explanatory levels. There is a tendency for this work to progress within a level largely ignoring the others which can lead to slippage between levels (Chater, Oaksford ...
Mike eOaksford
doaj +1 more source
ABSTRACT Philosophers often think agency is essentially connected with rationality, intention, or control. However, Minimalists argue that agency is just the power to cause a change; acids and boulders are agents too. Many philosophers treat Minimalism as a wild outlier, assuming its falsity without argument.
William Hornett
wiley +1 more source
ABSTRACT I argue that knowledge plays a distinctive role in psychological explanation that weaker epistemic states cannot because it is robust in the face of counterevidence in a way that they are not. Being robust in the face of counterevidence makes your belief robust in the face of counterargument.
Spencer Paulson
wiley +1 more source

