Results 251 to 260 of about 445,079 (291)
International Economic Review, 1997 Summary: This paper describes situations where commitment via delegation is beneficial, even when the delegation is unobservable and the players have the option to play the game themselves. The potential for such benefits depends on the type of delegation, incentive versus instructive, the possibility of repetition, and the probability of observability.
Chaim Fershtman, Ehud Kalai
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2014
The authors study properties of the following economic model. ``We consider an infinite-horizon game played between a principal P and an agent A, time is discrete. The principal and the agent play the same stage game in every period. Each period the principal chooses whether or not to delegate a project adoption choice to the agent, i.e.
Lipnowski, Elliot, Ramos, João
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The authors study properties of the following economic model. ``We consider an infinite-horizon game played between a principal P and an agent A, time is discrete. The principal and the agent play the same stage game in every period. Each period the principal chooses whether or not to delegate a project adoption choice to the agent, i.e.
Lipnowski, Elliot, Ramos, João
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American Journal of Health-System Pharmacy, 1976
The three basic elements of delegation (responsibility, authority and accountability) are discussed with regard to effective management. Major guidelines for effective delegation are noted, including: (1) securing a mutual commitment to responsibilities involved; (2) establishing goals and checkpoints; (3) giving appropriate authority to the delegate ...
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The three basic elements of delegation (responsibility, authority and accountability) are discussed with regard to effective management. Major guidelines for effective delegation are noted, including: (1) securing a mutual commitment to responsibilities involved; (2) establishing goals and checkpoints; (3) giving appropriate authority to the delegate ...
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SSRN Electronic Journal, 2015
Abstract This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat ...
Vranceanu, Radu, Sutan, A.
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Abstract This paper reports results from a three-player variant of the ultimatum game in which the Proposer can delegate to a third party his decision regarding how to share his endowment with a Responder with a standard veto right. However, the Responder cannot verify whether the delegation is effective or the third party merely plays a “scapegoat ...
Vranceanu, Radu, Sutan, A.
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From task delegation to role delegation
1997Roles may be analyzed in many ways: “abstract agents”; as power positions; as sets of obligations; etc. For sure one of the main facets of roles is their Delegation-Adoption nature. This is exactly the perspective we assume here: it is a partial view of roles, but a fundamental one.
Castelfranchi C, Falcone R
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Eureka!, 2018
Relying on another team member to handle important tasks can be difficult, but for business owners and team leaders to see their company grow, learning how to delegate is an essential skill to master, Tom Austin-Morgan writes.
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Relying on another team member to handle important tasks can be difficult, but for business owners and team leaders to see their company grow, learning how to delegate is an essential skill to master, Tom Austin-Morgan writes.
openaire +1 more source