Results 21 to 30 of about 89 (87)
Buddhismus a aristotelská logika
Filosofie Dnes, 2011 Abstrakt/Abstract Článek pojednává o buddhistické logice a jejím vztahu k logice aristotelské, zejména k principu sporu a principu vyloučeného třetího.
Jiří Holba
doaj +1 more source
TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHICAL UNDERSTANDING OF THE LOGICS OF FORMAL INCONSISTENCY
Manuscrito, 2015 In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in ...
WALTER CARNIELLI, ABÍLIO RODRIGUES
doaj +1 more source
Logical Investigations, 2020 Given a formal language, a metalanguage is a language which can express — amongst other things — statements about it and its properties. And a metatheory is a theory couched in that language concerning how some of those notions behave. Two such notions that have been of particular interest to modern logicians — for obvious reasons —
openaire +2 more sources
Heidegger on the ontological significance of the principle of noncontradiction
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue 3, Page 372-386, September 2025.Abstract The aim of this article is to break down to its principal arguments the abundant material recently published in Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe related to a conference given in December 1932 on the principle of noncontradiction (PNC). I will first highlight the importance in phenomenology of a correct interpretation of the PNC and then explain ...
François Jaran
wiley +1 more source
Heidegger, the contradiction of being, and the principle of sufficient reason
The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Volume 63, Issue S1, Page S11-S26, September 2025.Abstract In my Heidegger and the Contradiction of Being, I have argued that Heidegger's philosophizing about Being stumbles upon a contradiction (i.e., the first claim) and that he takes such a contradiction to be true (i.e., the second claim). Many interpreters have, however, resisted my interpretation by denying that Heidegger faces the contradiction
Filippo Casati
wiley +1 more source
Dialetheism and the countermodel problem
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 110, Issue 2, Page 709-733, March 2025.Abstract According to some dialetheists, we ought to reject the distinction between object and meta‐languages. Given that dialetheists advocate truth‐value gluts within their object‐language, whether in order to solve the liar paradox or for some other reason, this rejection of the object‐/meta‐language distinction comes with the commitment to use a ...
Andreas Fjellstad, Ben Martin
wiley +1 more source
Unveiling the nature of philosophical problems: Formal and conceptual aspects
Metaphilosophy, Volume 56, Issue 1, Page 17-34, January 2025.Abstract This paper approximates an intensional definitional distinction between philosophical problems and non‐philosophical problems. It contends that a philosophical problem consists of an inconsistent set M of propositions that satisfies certain characteristics.
Jens Harbecke
wiley +1 more source
The Liar Paradox in Plato [PDF]
Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology and Practical Philosophy, 2015 Although most scholars trace the Liar Paradox to Plato’s contemporary, Eubulides, the paper argues that Plato builds something very like the Liar Paradox into the very structure of his dialogues with significant consequences for understanding his views ...
Richard McDonough
doaj
Logic and Logical Philosophy, 2016 The concept of dialetheia and the claim of dialetheism has been examined and compared to such related concept as contradiction, antinomy, consistency and paraconsistency. Dialetheia is a true contradiction and dialetheism is the claim that there exists at least one dialetheia.
openaire +2 more sources
Philosophical Issues, Volume 34, Issue 1, Page 37-58, October 2024.Abstract I argue that level‐incoherence is epistemically valuable in a specific set of epistemic environments: those in which it is easy to acquire justified false beliefs about normative requirements of epistemic rationality. I argue that in these environments level‐incoherence is the rationally dominant strategy.
Claire Field
wiley +1 more source