Results 301 to 310 of about 565,364 (329)
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International Game Theory Review, 2000
We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation
Filar, Jerzy A., Petrosjan, Leon A.
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We consider dynamic cooperative games in characteristic function form in the sense that the characteristic function evolves over time in accordance with a difference or differential equation that is influenced not only by the current ("instantaneous") characteristic function but also by the solution concept used to allocate the benefits of cooperation
Filar, Jerzy A., Petrosjan, Leon A.
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Operations Research, 1991
In these games the searcher has a sequence of looks in which to detect the target, while the target chooses a new cell after each look in the knowledge of what cells have been searched so far. Since time is of the essence and the searcher's speed is bounded, the target has a tendency to choose cells far away from the most recent look.
Thomas, Lyn C., Washburn, Alan R.
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In these games the searcher has a sequence of looks in which to detect the target, while the target chooses a new cell after each look in the knowledge of what cells have been searched so far. Since time is of the essence and the searcher's speed is bounded, the target has a tendency to choose cells far away from the most recent look.
Thomas, Lyn C., Washburn, Alan R.
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Dynamic Leveraging–Deleveraging Games
Operations Research, 2020We endogenize the dynamics of a large borrower’s leverage based on a new type of game among the lender, the leveraging/deleveraging game. Leverage is mean reverting around a long-run level and explosive above an instability level. This is driven by the changing nature of the lenders’ game from strategic substitutability to one-sided strategic ...
Andreea Minca, Johannes Wissel
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Journal of Cybernetics, 1973
Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] were the first to use modern mathematics for constructing a fairly complete theory describing conflict-type situations. This led to a new and still rapidly developing branch of mathematics, namely the theory of games. In a conflict situation we have the participation of several active sides with different interests, able
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Von Neumann and Morgenstern [1] were the first to use modern mathematics for constructing a fairly complete theory describing conflict-type situations. This led to a new and still rapidly developing branch of mathematics, namely the theory of games. In a conflict situation we have the participation of several active sides with different interests, able
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Dynamic resource allocation games
Theoretical Computer Science, 2016zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Guy Avni +2 more
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Dynamical systems game theory and dynamics of games
Physica D: Nonlinear Phenomena, 2000zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Akiyama, E., Kaneko, K.
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2017
This chapter discusses a new class of games known as dynamic games. It begins by considering a two-player multi-stage game in extensive form in which the overall tree structure can be mathematically described in a manner that actually allows for games that are more general than those typically described in extensive form.
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This chapter discusses a new class of games known as dynamic games. It begins by considering a two-player multi-stage game in extensive form in which the overall tree structure can be mathematically described in a manner that actually allows for games that are more general than those typically described in extensive form.
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1981
Zero-sum, discrete time, stochastic systems are analyzed when the two players are allowed to use randomized strategies. The existence of a value function is proved under appropriate conditions. When the one-stage costs are positive and undiscounted, the minimizer has an optimal strategy, but the maximizer need not. However, if the costs are discounted,
Kumar, P. R., Shiau, T. H.
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Zero-sum, discrete time, stochastic systems are analyzed when the two players are allowed to use randomized strategies. The existence of a value function is proved under appropriate conditions. When the one-stage costs are positive and undiscounted, the minimizer has an optimal strategy, but the maximizer need not. However, if the costs are discounted,
Kumar, P. R., Shiau, T. H.
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SIAM Review
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hannelore De Silva, Karl Sigmund
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zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Hannelore De Silva, Karl Sigmund
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