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Epistemic Injustice and Epistemic Solidarity

2021
Abstract This chapter contains two more arguments against pessimism about moral testimony. First, it argues that epistemic justice sometimes requires you to accept moral testimony, despite the fact that doing so seems to clash with autonomy. Both good and bad experiences teach a person what matters, and how much things matter.
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Epistemic Aims of Education: Epistemic Autonomy or Epistemic Responsibility?

Abstract Robert Dearden set the stage for autonomy as an educational aim in 1972 when he proposed a new aim that he called ‘personal autonomy’, which he defined as ‘having reasons for what one thinks and does’. While philosophy of education in the early 2000s focused on autonomy as examining conceptions of the good life, more recent ...
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Epistemic Hubris

Social Epistemology
It is common nowadays for laypeople to take public stances on complex issues, such as the effectiveness of a vaccine or the seriousness of anthropogenic climate change, without any kind of disciplinary expertise. Yet those who do so act as if they were experts in the field, disseminating their thoughts and sometimes also spreading their advice ...
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Epistemics of the Virtual

2012
Proposing a new theory of fiction, this work reviews the confusion about perceived realism, metaphor, virtual worlds and the seemingly obvious distinction between what is true and what is false. The rise of new media, new technology, and creative products and services requires a new examination of what ‘real’ friends are, to what extent scientific ...
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The epistemics of Epistemics: An introduction

Discourse Studies, 2016
Michael Lynch, Douglas Macbeth
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Epistemic Values and Epistemic Viewpoints

1975
Chisholm suggests that the understanding and interpretation of various epistemic expressions may be best achieved by taking as a primitive a relation that is essentially evaluative in character. In Perceiving he bases his account on the relation of being-more-worthy-of-belief.
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