Results 221 to 230 of about 6,653 (261)

The Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs

2020
Abstract Ideally, we would have beliefs that satisfy norms of truth and rationality, as well as fostering the acquisition, retention and use of other relevant information. In reality, we have limited cognitive capacities and are subject to motivational biases on an everyday basis, and may also experience impairments in perception, memory,
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Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs

Synthese, 2018
My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that,
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The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief

Synthese, 2019
There is an important disagreement in contemporary epistemology over the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief. Many epistemologists argue that non-epistemic reasons cannot be good or normative reasons for holding beliefs: non-epistemic reasons might be good reasons for a subject to bring herself to hold a belief, the argument goes, but they ...
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On Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs

2005
This paper is about Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs. The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (i) a functional representation of an epistemic state called a disbelief function, and (ii) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. The main contribution of this paper is as follows.
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Belief Revision with General Epistemic States

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015
In order to properly regulate iterated belief revision, Darwiche and Pearl (1997) model belief revision as revising epistemic states by propositions. An epistemic state in their sense consists of a belief set and a set of conditional beliefs.
Hua Meng 0001, Hui Kou, Sanjiang Li
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Simultaneous Representation of Knowledge and Belief for Epistemic Planning with Belief Revision

Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 2020
We propose a novel approach to the problem of false belief revision in epistemic planning. Our state representations are pointed Kripke models with two binary relations over possible worlds: one representing agents' necessarily true knowledge, and one representing agents' possibly false beliefs.
David Buckingham, Daniel Kasenberg, Matthias Scheutz   +2 more
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Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment

Synthese, 1996
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Abhaya C. Nayak, Paul Nelson, Hanan Polansky   +2 more
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Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic [PDF]

Mathematical Social Sciences, 1996
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Epistemic beliefs as predictors of epistemic emotions: Extending a theoretical model

British Journal of Educational Psychology, 2017
Background The cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions states that if students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge (e.g., knowledge as simple and absolute) are incompatible with the epistemic nature of learning materials (
Tom Rosman, Anne‐Kathrin Mayer
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Epistemically Proper Belief

2018
This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author
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