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Epistemic Logic of Likelihood and Belief

Proceedings of the Thirty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2022
A major challenge in AI is dealing with uncertain information. While probabilistic approaches have been employed to address this issue, in many situations probabilities may not be available or may be unsuitable. As an alternative, qualitative approaches have been introduced to express that one event is no more probable than another.
James P. Delgrande, Joshua Sack, Gerhard Lakemeyer, Maurice Pagnucco   +3 more
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs

Synthese, 2020
A starting point for the sort of alethic epistemological approach that dominates both historical and contemporary western philosophy is that epistemic norms, standards, or ideals are to be characterized by appeal to some kind of substantively normative relationship between belief and truth.
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Epistemic Risk and Epistemic Utility for Beliefs

2022
AbstractIn this chapter, we meet Thomas Kelly’s (2014) argument for permissivism about rational belief. It is inspired by William James’ (1897) permissivism about attitudes to epistemic risk. We interpret Kelly’s argument using an account of epistemic value due to Kenny Easwaran (2016) and Kevin Dorst (2019).
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Epistemic conservatism and bare beliefs

Synthese, 2018
My subject is the kind of Epistemic Conservatism (EC) that says that an agent is in some measure justified in maintaining a belief simply in virtue of the fact that the agent has that belief. Quine’s alternative to positivist foundationalism, Chisholmian particularism, Rawls’s reflective equilibrium, and Bayesianism all seem to rely on EC. I argue that,
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Epistemic Profiles and Belief Structures

2012
The paper is devoted to a novel formalization of beliefs in multiagent systems. Our aim is to bridge the gap between idealized logical approaches to modeling beliefs and their actual implementations. Therefore the stages of belief acquisition, intermediate reasoning and final belief formation are isolated and analyzed.
Barbara Dunin-Keplicz, Andrzej Szalas
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Belief Revision with General Epistemic States

Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2015
In order to properly regulate iterated belief revision, Darwiche and Pearl (1997) model belief revision as revising epistemic states by propositions. An epistemic state in their sense consists of a belief set and a set of conditional beliefs.
Hua Meng 0001, Hui Kou, Sanjiang Li
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