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The epistemic norm of inference and non-epistemic reasons for belief
Synthese, 2019There is an important disagreement in contemporary epistemology over the possibility of non-epistemic reasons for belief. Many epistemologists argue that non-epistemic reasons cannot be good or normative reasons for holding beliefs: non-epistemic reasons might be good reasons for a subject to bring herself to hold a belief, the argument goes, but they ...
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On Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs
2005This paper is about Spohn's theory of epistemic beliefs. The main ingredients of Spohn's theory are (i) a functional representation of an epistemic state called a disbelief function, and (ii) a rule for revising this function in light of new information. The main contribution of this paper is as follows.
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Belief change as change in epistemic entrenchment
Synthese, 1996zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Abhaya C. Nayak +2 more
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Common belief in monotonic epistemic logic [PDF]
Mathematical Social Sciences, 1996 zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Simultaneous Representation of Knowledge and Belief for Epistemic Planning with Belief Revision
Proceedings of the Seventeenth International Conference on Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning, 2020We propose a novel approach to the problem of false belief revision in epistemic planning. Our state representations are pointed Kripke models with two binary relations over possible worlds: one representing agents' necessarily true knowledge, and one representing agents' possibly false beliefs.
David Buckingham +2 more
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Epistemic beliefs as predictors of epistemic emotions: Extending a theoretical model
British Journal of Educational Psychology, 2017Background The cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions states that if students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge (e.g., knowledge as simple and absolute) are incompatible with the epistemic nature of learning materials (
Tom Rosman, Anne‐Kathrin Mayer
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The Epistemic Innocence of Optimistically Biased Beliefs
2019Optimistically biased beliefs are beliefs about oneself that are more positive than is warranted by the evidence. Optimistically biased beliefs are the result of the influence of cognitive and motivational factors on people’s capacity to acquire, retrieve, and use information about themselves, and they resist counterevidence due to biases in belief ...
Bortolotti L +2 more
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2018
This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author
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This chapter argues that the sort of normativity that is at the heart of epistemology is the sort of normativity involved in assessments of whether a subject’s belief satisfies the distinctly epistemic standards on knowledge. It introduces the term ‘epistemically proper’ to designate the status a belief has when it satisfies these standards. The author
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Epistemic equivalence of extended belief hierarchies
Games and Economic Behavior, 2014zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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Interrogative Belief Revision Based on Epistemic Strategies
Studia Logica, 2012zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
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