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Deliberative Indispensability and Epistemic Justification [PDF]
, 2015 Many of us care about the existence of ethical facts because such facts appear crucial to making sense of our practical lives. On one tempting line of thought, this idea does more than raise the metaethical stakes: it can also play a central role in ...
McPherson, Tristram
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Epistemically blameworthy belief [PDF]
Philosophical Studies, 2019 AbstractWhen subjects violate epistemic standards or norms, we sometimes judge them blameworthy rather than blameless. For instance, we might judge a subject blameworthy for dogmatically continuing to believe a claim even after receiving evidence which undermines it.
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Free Will as An Epistemically Innocent False Belief
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy, 2023 In this paper I aim to establish that our belief in free will is epistemically innocent. Many contemporary accounts that deal with the potential “illusion” of freedom seek to describe the pragmatic benefits of belief in free will, such as how it facilitates or grounds our notions of moral responsibility or basic desert. While these proposals have their
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Pragmatic Encroachment: An Epistemic Explanation in favor of Religious Beliefs. [PDF]
پژوهشنامه فلسفه دین, 2019 In this article, we address the role of pragmatic considerations in knowledge and, in particular, religious knowledge, as one of the challenging topics in epistemology and religious epistemology, and suggest a different model for the relation between ...
Ali Kalani Tehrani +1 more
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Belief as a non-epistemic adaptive benefit
Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2019 Abstract Although rationalization about one's own beliefs and actions can improve an individual's future decisions, beliefs can provide other benefits unrelated to their epistemic truth value, such as group cohesion and identity.
Cunningham , William +2 more
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Belief and pluralistic ignorance
Filosofia Unisinos, 2020 Pluralistic ignorance is usually analyzed in terms of social norms. Recently, Bjerring, Hansen and Pedersen (2014) describe and define this phenomenon in terms of beliefs, actions and evidence.
Marco Antonio Joven Romero
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Virtue Epistemologies and Epistemic Vice [PDF]
Athens Journal of Humanities & Arts, 2015 While virtue epistemologists agree that knowledge consists in having beliefs appropriately formed in accordance with epistemic virtue, they disagree regarding what constitutes an epistemic virtue.
Eric Kraemer
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Student Attitudes Contribute to the Effectiveness of a Genomics CURE
Journal of Microbiology & Biology Education, 2022 The Genomics Education Partnership (GEP) engages students in a course-based undergraduate research experience (CURE). To better understand the student attributes that support success in this CURE, we asked students about their attitudes using previously ...
David Lopatto +97 more
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Expert-oriented abilities vs. novice-oriented abilities: An alternative account of epistemic authority [PDF]
, 2018 According to a recent account of epistemic authority proposed by Linda Zagzebski (2012), it is rational for laypersons to believe on authority when they conscientiously judge that the authority is more likely to form true beliefs and avoid false ones ...
Carter +10 more
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A Belief Revision Framework for Revising Epistemic States with Partial Epistemic States [PDF]
Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 2010 Belief revision performs belief change on an agent's beliefs when new evidence (either of the form of a propositional formula or of the form of a total pre-order on a set of interpretations) is received. Jeffrey's rule is commonly used for revising probabilistic epistemic states when new information is probabilistically uncertain.
Jianbing Ma, Weiru Liu, Salem Benferhat
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