Results 21 to 30 of about 330 (74)
Normative Alethic Pluralism [PDF]
, 2018 Some philosophers have argued that truth is a norm of judgement and have provided a variety of formulations of this general thesis. In this paper, I shall side with these philosophers and assume that truth is a norm of judgement.
A Gibbard +35 more
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom [PDF]
, 2019 In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues that the belief in determinism is self-defeating.
Luca Zanetti
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Why responsible belief is blameless belief [PDF]
, 2010 No description ...
Booth, Anthony Robert, Peels, Rik
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Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value [PDF]
, 2018 A basic question for virtue epistemology is whether it represents a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to that offered by internalism and externalism. It is argued that virtue epistemology does not offer us a distinct source of normativity.
Lockie, Robert
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WARRANT AND CONDITIONS FOR WARRANT IN ALVIN PLANTINGA’S PHILOSOPHY [PDF]
, 2019 Warrant and Conditions for Warrant in Alvin Plantinga’s Philosophy. Warrant is the central concept of Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology. As Plantinga suggests it, warrant is that quantity or quality which together with belief and truth constitutes knowledge.
MUSTAȚĂ, Gabriel
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, 2019 In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally.
Khazaei, Zahra
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Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity [PDF]
, 2020 What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is ...
Oliveira, Luis R. G.
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, 2019 This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view.
Hughes, Nick
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Responsibility for implicit bias [PDF]
, 2012 Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the ...
Holroyd, Jules
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Peut-on être blâmé pour ses croyances? : le déontologisme épistémique face au problème de l'involontarisme doxastique [PDF]
, 2012 Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime.
Côté-Bouchard, Charles
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