Results 31 to 40 of about 88,808 (113)
Why responsible belief is blameless belief [PDF]
, 2010 No description ...
Booth, Anthony Robert, Peels, Rik
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Responsibility for implicit bias [PDF]
, 2012 Philosophers who have written about implicit bias have claimed or implied that individuals are not responsible, and therefore not blameworthy, for their implicit biases, and that this is a function of the nature of implicit bias as implicit: below the ...
Holroyd, Jules
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Virtue epistemology and the sources of epistemic value [PDF]
, 2018 A basic question for virtue epistemology is whether it represents a ‘third force’ – a different source of normativity to that offered by internalism and externalism. It is argued that virtue epistemology does not offer us a distinct source of normativity.
Lockie, Robert
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WARRANT AND CONDITIONS FOR WARRANT IN ALVIN PLANTINGA’S PHILOSOPHY [PDF]
, 2019 Warrant and Conditions for Warrant in Alvin Plantinga’s Philosophy. Warrant is the central concept of Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology. As Plantinga suggests it, warrant is that quantity or quality which together with belief and truth constitutes knowledge.
MUSTAȚĂ, Gabriel
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Evading the Doxastic Puzzle by Deflating Epistemic Normativity [PDF]
, 2020 What I call the Doxastic Puzzle, is the impression that while each of these claims seems true, at least one of them must be false: (a) Claims of the form ‘S ought to have doxastic attitude D towards p at t’ are sometimes true at t, (b) If Φ-ing at t is ...
Oliveira, Luis R. G.
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Deontologismo epistémico: uma abordagem subjetivista
, 2005 Das coisas que podem ser ditas sobre a nocao de justificacao epistemica, a melhor delas e que ela e uma condicao necessaria para a obtencao de conhecimento.
Felipe de Matos Müller
semanticscholar +1 more source
, 2019 In the philosophy of action, agency manifests the capacity of the agent to act. An agent is one who acts voluntarily, consciously and intentionally.
Khazaei, Zahra
core
, 2019 This article argues that there can be epistemic dilemmas: situations in which one faces conflicting epistemic requirements with the result that whatever one does, one is doomed to do wrong from the epistemic point of view.
Hughes, Nick
core
Peut-on être blâmé pour ses croyances? : le déontologisme épistémique face au problème de l'involontarisme doxastique [PDF]
, 2012 Peut-on parfois être blâmé pour ses croyances ? Selon les partisans du déontologisme épistémique, la pratique ordinaire consistant à blâmer et critiquer les gens pour leurs croyances est tout à fait légitime.
Côté-Bouchard, Charles
core
Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism [PDF]
In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in ...
Odoj, Ewa
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