Results 31 to 40 of about 55,905 (77)

Epistemic Injustice

Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte, 2020
S. Wallaert
semanticscholar   +1 more source

Ethics and responsibility in biohybrid robotics research. [PDF]

Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A
Mestre R, Astobiza AM, Webster-Wood VA, Ryan M, Saif MTA.   +4 more
europepmc   +1 more source

Epistemic deontologism and the voluntarist strategy against doxastic involuntarism

, 2011
According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification, a belief is justified when it is our obligation or duty as rational creatures to believe it. However, this view faces an important objection according to which we cannot have such epistemic obligations since our beliefs are never under our voluntary control.
openaire   +1 more source

Response to Elqayam, Nottelmann, Peels and Vahid on my paper 'Perspectivism, deontologism and epistemic poverty'

, 2016
I here respond to four SERRC commentators on my paper ‘Perspectivism, Deontologism and Epistemic Poverty’: Shira Elqayam, Nikolaj Nottelmann, Rik Peels and Hamid Vahid. I maintain that all accounts of epistemic justification must be constrained by two limit positions which have to be avoided.
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification: a reassessment

SynthÈse, 2011
This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance.
Nikolaj Nottelmann, Nottelmann Nikolaj
exaly   +5 more sources

‘Ought’ implies ‘can’ against epistemic deontologism: beyond doxastic involuntarism

SynthÈse, 2017
According to epistemic deontologism, attributions of epistemic justification are deontic claims about what we ought to believe. One of the most prominent objections to this conception, due mainly to William P. Alston, is that the principle that ‘ought’ implies ‘can’ (OIC) rules out deontologism because our beliefs are not under our voluntary control ...
Charles Côté-Bouchard
exaly   +4 more sources

On the compatibility of deontologism with moderate externalism in a theory of epistemic justification: M. Bergmann's solution

Социально-гуманитарные знания, 2022
В статье рассматриваются альтернативные способы эпистемологической концептуализации обоснования, заданные в парадигмах интернализма и экстернализма, и анализируется их соотношение с принципами эпистемического деонтологизма. Производится реконструкция и анализ аргументов эпистемолога М.
А.В. Галухин
exaly   +3 more sources

Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism 1

2017
P. Bondy
exaly   +3 more sources

Nikolaj Nottelmann: Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism

Erkenntnis, 2014
Andrea Kruse
semanticscholar   +3 more sources