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Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility

Metaphilosophy, 2022
AbstractAccording toUniversal Epistemic Deontology, all of our doxastic attitudes are open to deontological evaluations of obligation and permissibility. This view thus implies that we are responsible for all of our doxastic attitudes. But many philosophers have puzzled over whether we could be so responsible.
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness

Erkenntnis, 2011
We tend to prescribe and appraise doxastic states in terms that are broadly deontic. According to a simple argument, such prescriptions and appraisals are improper, because they wrongly presuppose that our doxastic states are voluntary. One strategy for resisting this argument, recently endorsed by a number of philosophers, is to claim that our ...
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The Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification

Philosophical Perspectives, 1988
The terms, 'justified', 'justification', and their cognates are most naturally understood in what we may term a "deontological" way, as having to do with obligation, permission, requirement, blame, and the like. We may think of requirement, prohibition, and permission as the basic deontological terms, with obligation, and duty as species of requirement,
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification and doxastic voluntarism

Analysis, 1994
According to the deontological conception of epistemic justification as endorsed by most traditional epistemologists, one is justified in holding a belief if and only if one is in the clear, or epistemically responsible, in holding the belief. William Alston criticizes this conception and any theory of epistemic justification based on this conception ...
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Epistemic Deontologism and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense

Dialogue, 2015
The following claims are independently plausible but jointly inconsistent: (1) epistemic deontologism is correct (i.e., there are some beliefs we ought to have, and some beliefs we ought not to have); (2) we have no voluntary control over our beliefs; (3) S’s lack of control over whether she φs implies that S has no obligation to φ or to not φ (i.e ...
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Hobartian Voluntarism: Grounding a Deontological Conceptionof Epistemic Justification

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2000
Our concept of epistemic justification is often thought to be deontological, so that justified and unjustified are epistemic terms of praise and blame. This conception of justification requires the truth of voluntarism - the thesis that we have control over our beliefs which seems false. I attempt to present a mostly plausible version of voluntarism by
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Let’s Bite the Bullet on Deontological Epistemic Justification: A Response to Robert Lockie

Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 2015
In his paper, Robert Lockie points out that adherents of the deontological conception of epistemic justification, in meeting the epistemic poverty objection, have argued that there is also such a thing as subjective epistemic justification. Lockie argues that subjective accounts of epistemic justification must take cultural limits seriously and that ...
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Chisholming away at Plantinga's critique of epistemic deontology

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1998
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Epistemic Deontologism and Control

2018
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On Deontological Conception of Epistemic Justification: A Criticism and an Alternative

CHUL HAK SA SANG - Journal of Philosophical Ideas, 2013
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