Results 31 to 40 of about 330 (74)

Doxastic Responsibility and the Challenge of Doxastic Voluntarism [PDF]

open access: yes
In the article, I present the debate on doxastic voluntarism and its rela‑ tion to doxastic responsibility. I outline the discussion in the literature, focusing on Alston’s argument against doxastic responsibility, and then present my own position in ...
Odoj, Ewa
core   +2 more sources

Epistemic justification as a normative concept [PDF]

open access: yes, 2005
There is a way of talking about epistemic justification that involves the notion of our being subject to epistemic obligations the failure to comply with makes us blameworthy, called the deontological conception.
Booth, Anthony Robert
core  

To be able to, or to be able not to? That is the Question. A Problem for the Transcendental Argument for Freedom. [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
A type of transcendental argument for libertarian free will maintains that if acting freely requires the availability of alternative possibilities, and determinism holds, then one is not justified in asserting that there is no free will.
Elzein, Nadine, Pernu, Tuomas K.
core  

The deliverances of warranted Christian belief [PDF]

open access: yes, 2015
After more than 2500 years of philosophy, it is very hard to leave a new and lasting trace in this perennial human enterprise. A pretty sure sign of such a trace is that people begin to wonder what exacdy it is that the philosopher claims.
Schönecker, Dieter
core  

Is epistemic blame distinct from moral blame? [PDF]

open access: yes, 2019
In contemporary epistemology, recent attempts have been made to resist the notion of epistemic blame. This view, which I refer to as ‘epistemic blame skepticism,’ seems to challenge the notion of epistemic blame by reducing apparent cases of the ...
Meehan, Daniella
core  

A Comprehensive Account of Blame: Self-Blame, Non-Moral Blame, and Blame for the Non-Voluntary [PDF]

open access: yes
Blame is multifarious. It can be passionate or dispassionate. It can be expressed or kept private. We blame both the living and the dead. And we blame ourselves as well as others. What’s more, we blame ourselves, not only for our moral failings, but also
Portmore, Douglas W.
core  

Doxastic Voluntarism, Epistemic Deontology and Belief-contravening Commitments [PDF]

open access: yes, 2013
Defenders of doxastic voluntarism accept that we can voluntarily commit ourselves to propositions, including belief-contravening propositions. Thus, defenders of doxastic voluntarism allow that we can choose to believe propositions that are negatively ...
Shaffer, Michael J.
core  

Two notions of scientific justification [PDF]

open access: yes, 2006
Scientific claims can be assessed epistemically in either of two ways: according to scientific standards, or by means of philosophical arguments such as the no-miracle argument in favor of scientific realism.
Adam, Matthias
core  

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