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Epistemic Emotions: a Natural Kind? [PDF]

Philosophical Inquiries, 2014
The general aim of this article is to consider whether various affective phenomena – feelings like the feeling of knowing, of familiarity, of certainty, etc., but also phenomena like curiosity, interest, surprise and trust – which have been labelled ...
Meylan, Anne
core   +4 more sources

Measuring emotions during epistemic activities: Psychometric validation of the Persian epistemic emotions scale

Psihologija, 2023
As there are not enough measurement instruments to assess emotions during epistemic activities, this research aimed to evaluate the psychometric properties of the epistemic emotions scale among speakers of the Persian language. The scale has previously been used and studied in different cultural contexts.
Mohsen Ahvanuiee, Hossein Kareshki, Seyed Yazdi   +2 more
openaire   +2 more sources

Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality [PDF]

Topoi, 2021
AbstractEmotions seem to be epistemically assessable: fear of an onrushing truck is epistemically justified whereas,mutatis mutandis, fear of a peanut rolling on the floor is not. But there is a difficulty in understanding whyemotions are epistemically assessable.
Tricia Magalotti, Uriah Kriegel
openaire   +1 more source

Awe and Wonder in Scientific Practice: Implications for the Relationship Between Science and Religion [PDF]

, 2020
This paper examines the role of awe and wonder in scientific practice. Drawing on evidence from psychological research and the writings of scientists and science communicators, I argue that awe and wonder play a crucial role in scientific ...
A Calaprice, A Morton, A Smith, AF Danvers, AF Danvers, AJ Heschel, AJ Heschel, AR Damasio, C Darwin, C Darwin, CL Caldwell-Harris, D Keltner, D Keltner, GK Russell, H Cruz De, H Cruz De, H Wettstein, JE Stellar, KE Darbor, KP Tobia, M McGhee, MN Shiota, N Carroll, NH Frijda, P Lamont, P Valdesolo, PK Piff, R Dawkins, R Dawkins, R Dawkins, R Feynman, S Gottlieb, S Schliesser, S Steinhart, TS Kuhn, V Griskevicius, W James   +36 more
core   +1 more source

Surprised–curious–confused: Epistemic emotions and knowledge exploration. [PDF]

Emotion, 2020
Some epistemic emotions, such as surprise and curiosity, have attracted increasing scientific attention, whereas others, such as confusion, have yet to receive the attention they deserve. In addition, little is known about the relations between these emotions, their joint antecedents and outcomes, and how they differ from other emotions prompted during
Elisabeth Vogl, Reinhard Pekrun, Kou Murayama, Kristina Loderer   +3 more
openaire   +5 more sources

Epistemic Emotions Justified

Philosophies, 2022
The view that emotions can provide defeasible justification for evaluative beliefs is widespread in the emotion literature. Despite this, the question of whether epistemic emotions can provide defeasible justification for theoretical beliefs has been almost entirely ignored.
openaire   +2 more sources

The Rationalities of Emotion [PDF]

, 2016
I argue that emotions are not only rational in-themselves, strictly speaking, but they are also instrumentally rational, epistemically rational, and evaluatively rational.
Mun, Cecilea
core   +3 more sources

Measuring emotions during epistemic activities: the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales

Cognition and Emotion, 2016
Measurement instruments assessing multiple emotions during epistemic activities are largely lacking. We describe the construction and validation of the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, which measure surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, anxiety, frustration, and boredom occurring during epistemic cognitive activities.
Pekrun, Reinhard, Vogl, Elisabeth, Muis, Krista R., Sinatra, Gale M.   +3 more
openaire   +4 more sources

Epistemic Perceptualism, Skill, and the Regress Problem [PDF]

, 2019
A novel solution is offered for how emotional experiences can function as sources of immediate prima facie justification for evaluative beliefs, and in such a way that suffices to halt a justificatory regress.
Carter, J. Adam
core   +2 more sources

Epistemic Sentimentalism and Epistemic Reason-Responsiveness [PDF]

, 2018
Epistemic Sentimentalism is the view that emotional experiences such as fear and guilt are a source of immediate justification for evaluative beliefs. For example, guilt can sometimes immediately justify a subject’s belief that they have done something ...
Cowan, Robert
core   +2 more sources