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Epistemic Emotions and Metacognitive Feelings

2021
Epistemic emotions such as surprise, curiosity, and confusion occur during epistemic cognitive activities. They result from cognitive appraisals about the (mis-)alignment between new information and existing knowledge or beliefs. More specifically, epistemic emotions can be triggered by discrepant or contradictory information that prompts cognitive ...
Vogl, Elisabeth   +2 more
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Epistemic beliefs as predictors of epistemic emotions: Extending a theoretical model

British Journal of Educational Psychology, 2017
Background The cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions states that if students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge (e.g., knowledge as simple and absolute) are incompatible with the epistemic nature of learning materials (
Tom Rosman, Anne‐Kathrin Mayer
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Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?

Philosophical Psychology, 2016
AbstractThis article addresses the question whether epistemic emotions (such as surprise, curiosity, uncertainty, and feelings of knowing) are in any sense inherently metacognitive. The paper begins with some critical discussion of a recent suggestion made by Joelle Proust, that these emotions might be implicitly or procedurally metacognitive.
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The role of epistemic emotions in learning from others

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2021
AbstractPhillips et al. discuss whether knowledge or beliefs are more basic representations of others' minds, focusing on the primary function of knowledge representation: learning from others. We discuss links between emotion and “knowledge versus belief,” and particularly the role of emotions in learning from others in mechanisms such as “social ...
Erdemli, Asli   +2 more
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Epistemic Violence and Emotional Misperception

Hypatia, 2019
I expand upon Kristie Dotson's concept of “epistemic violence” by identifying another type of epistemic violence that arises in the context of nonverbal communication. “Emotional misperception,” as I call it, occurs when the following conditions are met: (1) A misreads B's nonlinguistic expression of emotion, (2) owing to reliable ignorance, (3 ...
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The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience

Emotion Review, 2020
Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance ...
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RACIAL VIOLENCE, EMOTIONAL FRICTION, AND EPISTEMIC ACTIVISM

Angelaki, 2019
Using Iris Marion Young’s framework, this essay looks at racial violence as one of the many “faces” of racial oppression (which also include exploitation, marginalization, powerlessness, and cultur...
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Response to commentaries: From complexity to epistemic emotions

Cognitive Neuroscience, 2015
I would like to thank our commentators for their most thoughtful and enlightening commentaries. Three themes emerge from six commentaries, which we now take the opportunity to respond to. These themes relate to the (1) the complexity and detail with which we model our world, (2) the key relationship between drives or preferences and priors defined in ...
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The Anxious Inquirer. Emotions and Epistemic Uncertainty

2021
Dans ma thèse, je développe un modèle révisionniste de la nature psychologique du doute en tant qu'expérience affective. Pourquoi le doute surgit-il en nous ? S'éloignant d'un cadre cartésien dans lequel le doute émerge d'une réflexion sur nos propres croyances, je souligne que le doute est le plus souvent quelque chose qui nous "frappe".
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Epistemic Emotions and the Value of Truth

Acta Analytica, 2019
In this paper, I discuss the intrinsic value of truth from the perspective of the emotion studies in virtue epistemology. The strategy is the one that looks at epistemic emotions as driving forces towards truth as the most valuable epistemic good. But in doing so, a puzzle arises: how can the value of truth be intrinsic (as the most valuable epistemic ...
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