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Epistemic Value of Emotions

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Epistemic Emotions and Metacognitive Feelings

2021
Epistemic emotions such as surprise, curiosity, and confusion occur during epistemic cognitive activities. They result from cognitive appraisals about the (mis-)alignment between new information and existing knowledge or beliefs. More specifically, epistemic emotions can be triggered by discrepant or contradictory information that prompts cognitive ...
Vogl, Elisabeth   +2 more
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Epistemic beliefs as predictors of epistemic emotions: Extending a theoretical model

British Journal of Educational Psychology, 2017
Background The cognitive incongruity model of epistemic beliefs and emotions states that if students’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge (e.g., knowledge as simple and absolute) are incompatible with the epistemic nature of learning materials (
Tom Rosman, Anne‐Kathrin Mayer
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Epistemic Emotions and the Value of Truth

Acta Analytica, 2019
In this paper, I discuss the intrinsic value of truth from the perspective of the emotion studies in virtue epistemology. The strategy is the one that looks at epistemic emotions as driving forces towards truth as the most valuable epistemic good. But in doing so, a puzzle arises: how can the value of truth be intrinsic (as the most valuable epistemic ...
Laura Candiotto
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The role of epistemic emotions in learning from others

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2021
AbstractPhillips et al. discuss whether knowledge or beliefs are more basic representations of others' minds, focusing on the primary function of knowledge representation: learning from others. We discuss links between emotion and “knowledge versus belief,” and particularly the role of emotions in learning from others in mechanisms such as “social ...
Erdemli, Asli   +2 more
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Are epistemic emotions metacognitive?

Philosophical Psychology, 2016
AbstractThis article addresses the question whether epistemic emotions (such as surprise, curiosity, uncertainty, and feelings of knowing) are in any sense inherently metacognitive. The paper begins with some critical discussion of a recent suggestion made by Joelle Proust, that these emotions might be implicitly or procedurally metacognitive.
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Epistemic emotions and self-trust [PDF]

open access: yesPhenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
AbstractEpistemic emotions – namely affective phenomena like curiosity, certainty, and doubt – have been claimed to play a key role in epistemic evaluation and motivation, and, relatedly, to be an integral aspect of the epistemic virtues. In this paper I argue that the experience of epistemic emotions is extensively shaped by self-trust.
Anna Bortolan
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The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience

Emotion Review, 2020
Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance ...
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The Epistemic Value of Emotions in Politics

Philosophia, 2017
In this paper, I consider emotional reactions in response to political facts, and I investigate how they may provide relevant knowledge about those facts. I assess the value of such knowledge, both from an epistemic and a political perspective. Concerning the epistemic part, I argue that, although emotions are not in themselves sufficient to ground ...
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