Results 11 to 20 of about 3,262 (253)
Wohlrapp's concept of justification
Informal Logic, 2017 The first two sections of this paper jointly comprise an edited version of the commentary I presented in the panel discussion of Harald R. Wohlrapp, The concept of argument: A philosophical foundation at the OSSA 11 conference, May 2016.
Derek Allen
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Philosophies, 2022 The view that emotions can provide defeasible justification for evaluative beliefs is widespread in the emotion literature. Despite this, the question of whether epistemic emotions can provide defeasible justification for theoretical beliefs has been ...
Laura Silva
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Conservation of epistemic responsibility by external epistemic in point of view of Ayatollah Javadi Amoli [PDF]
حکمت اسرا, 2021 Epistemic duty issue is one of the most important subjects in epistemology. In contrast to the externalism approach, which emphasizes on epistemic duty and responsibility for justification of a belief, the internalism approach regarding epistemology is ...
zeinab askarian +2 more
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck [PDF]
Synthese, 2017 Among epistemologists, it is not uncommon to relate various forms of epistemic luck to the vexed debate between internalists and externalists. But there are many internalism/externalism debates in epistemology, and it is not always clear how these debates relate to each other.
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Kuhn and the Distinction from Discovery/Justification [PDF]
حکمت و فلسفه, 2020 In this paper, by reviewing the main components of Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy it will become evident that he is a critic on the distinction between the context of discovery/justification in the methodology of science. His reasoning consists of: 1.
Ahmad Ebadi, Mohammad Emdadi Masouleh
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Propositional epistemic luck, epistemic risk, and epistemic justification [PDF]
Synthese, 2016 If a subject has a true belief, and she has good evidence for it, and there’s no evidence against it, why should it matter if she doesn’t believe on the basis of the good available evidence? After all, properly based beliefs are no likelier to be true than their corresponding improperly based beliefs, as long as the subject possesses the same good ...
Patrick Bondy, Duncan Pritchard
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The priority of Propositional Justification
Estudios de Filosofía, 2019 Turri argues against what he calls an “orthodox” view of the relationship between propositional and doxastic justification, according to which (Basis) it is sufficient for S to be doxastically justified in believing p that p is propositionally justified ...
Erhan Demircioglu
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Threshold of justification of emergency regulations: On coherentism requirement for the justification of measures adopted in the Czech Republic during the COVID-19 pandemic [PDF]
Archiwum Filozofii Prawa i Filozofii Społecznej, 2021 The article deals with justification of generally binding legal acts as part of a state governed by the rule of law. The “state of exception” caused by the COVID-19 pandemic adds a new dimension to the issue of justification.
Pavel Ondřejek
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Epistemic Justification, Rights, and Permissibility [PDF]
Logos & Episteme, 2012 Can we understand epistemic justification in terms of epistemic rights? In this paper, we consider two arguments for the claim that we cannot and in doing so, we provide two arguments for the claim that we can. First, if, as many think, William James is right that the epistemic aim is to believe all true propositions and not to believe any false ...
Booth, A.R., Peels, H.D.
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Epistemic Justification and Deductive Closure
Crítica, 2018 Epistemic Justification and Deductive ...
Samir Okasha
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