Results 181 to 190 of about 10,593 (211)

Epistemic conditional logics

1996
This paper develops two conditional logics that allows one to reason about the belief of another agent (which reasons in conditional logic himself). The desirable properties of such logics that reason about the beliefs of another non-monotonic agent are discussed and the two logics proposed here are shown to have those properties.
Ana María Monteiro, Jacques Wainer
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An Epistemic Logic with Hypotheses

2011
We introduce a variant of the standard epistemic logic S5 for reasoning about knowledge under hypotheses or background assumptions. The modal operator of necessity expressing what is known is parameterised with a hypothesis. The operator can be described as relative necessity, a notion already used by Chellas to describe conditionality.
Levan Uridia, Dirk Walther 0002
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Infinitary S5‐Epistemic Logic [PDF]

Mathematical Logic Quarterly, 1997
AbstractIt is known that a theory in S5‐epistemic logic with several agents may have numerous models. This is because each such model specifies also what an agent knows about infinite intersections of events, while the expressive power of the logic is limited to finite conjunctions of formulas.
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Persistence and Minimality in Epistemic Logic

Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, 1998
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Wiebe van der Hoek, Jan Jaspars, Elias Thijsse   +2 more
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ON EPISTEMIC LOGIC AND LOGICAL OMNISCIENCE

1986
We consider the logical omniscience problem of epistemic logic. We argue that the problem is due to the way in which knowledge and belief are captured in Hintikka's possible worlds semantics. We describe an alternative approach in which propositions are sets of worlds, and knowledge and belief are simply a list of propositions for each agent.
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Epistemic foundations of logic

Journal of Philosophical Logic, 1976
The foundations of logic should be obvious and compelling. They should at least explain why we may not deny the tautologies of this or that logical system, if we are to have a rational systen of beliefs. I believe that standard semantics helps to explain why the tautologies of the sentential calculus and lower predicate calculus should not be rejected ...
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INFINITARY EPISTEMIC LOGIC

1994
It is known that a theory in S5-epistemic logic with several agents may have numerous models. This is because each such model specifies also what an agent knows about infinite intersections of events, while the expressive power of the logic is limited to finite conjunctions of formulas.
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Temporalizing Epistemic Default Logic

Journal of Logic, Language and Information, 1998
zbMATH Open Web Interface contents unavailable due to conflicting licenses.
Wiebe van der Hoek, John-Jules Ch. Meyer, Jan Treur   +2 more
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Dynamic Epistemic Temporal Logic

2009
We introduce a new type of arrow in the update frames (or "action models") of Dynamic Epistemic Logic in a way that enables us to reason about epistemic temporal dynamics in multi-agent systems that need not be synchronous. Since van Benthem and Pacuit (later joined by Hoshi and Gerbrandy) showed that standard Dynamic Epistemic Logic necessarily ...
Bryan Renne, Joshua Sack, Audrey Yap
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Epistemic logic and logical omniscience: A survey

International Journal of Intelligent Systems, 1997
Reasoning about knowledge and belief has been investigated from the points of view of philosophy, game theory, distributed systems, and artificial intelligence. A formal framework for an investigation of reasoning about knowledge and belief is provided by epistemic logic.
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