Results 241 to 250 of about 24,595 (270)
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2005
AbstractI discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only (at best) eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all ...
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AbstractI discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only (at best) eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all ...
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Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2008
Richard Greene, Rachel Robison
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Richard Greene, Rachel Robison
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Scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemicangst
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2005A commonly expressed worry in the contemporary literature on the problem of epistemological scepticism is that there is something deeply intellectually unsatisfying about the dominant anti-sceptical theories. In this paper I outline the main approaches to scepticism and argue that they each fail to capture what is essential to the sceptical challenge ...
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Conclusive Reasons and Epistemic Luck
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 2015What is it to have conclusive reasons to believe a proposition P? According to a view famously defended by Dretske, a reason R is conclusive for P just in case [R would not be the case unless P were the case]. I argue that, while knowing that P is plausibly related to having conclusive reasons to believe that P, having such reasons cannot be understood
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THE EPISTEMIC ANALYSIS OF LUCK
Episteme, 2015AbstractDuncan Pritchard has argued that luck is fundamentally a modal notion: an event is lucky when it occurs in the actual world, but does not occur in more than half of the relevant nearby possible worlds. Jennifer Lackey has provided counterexamples to accounts which, like Pritchard's, only allow for the existence of improbable lucky events.
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Two Varieties of Epistemic Luck
2005AbstractI examine two species of epistemic luck that I claim are not benign and explain how they feature in the main epistemological debates. The first species of epistemic luck—what I call ‘veritic’ luck—can be handled with a modest ‘relevant alternatives’ account of knowledge that is specifically defined so that it counters this type of epistemic ...
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