Results 231 to 240 of about 24,595 (270)
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Synthese, 2006
There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest
Avram Hiller, Ram Neta
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There is some consensus that for S to know that p, it cannot be merely a matter of luck that S’s belief that p is true. This consideration has led Duncan Pritchard and others to propose a safety condition on knowledge. In this paper, we argue that the safety condition is not a proper formulation of the intuition that knowledge excludes luck. We suggest
Avram Hiller, Ram Neta
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Metaphilosophy, 2006
: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of ...
Duncan Pritchard
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: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of ...
Duncan Pritchard
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Synthese, 2009
Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
Erkenntnis, 2021We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many.
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Philosophical Studies, 2011
Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
Anthony Brueckner, Christopher T. Buford
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Kelly Becker has argued that in an externalist anti-luck epistemology, we must hold that knowledge requires the satisfaction of both a modalized tracking condition and a process reliability condition. We raise various problems for the examples that are supposed to establish this claim.
Anthony Brueckner, Christopher T. Buford
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The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1994
L'A. remet en question la these de M. Engel, i.e. la connaissance serait en definitive qu'une question de chance, these developpee dans son article « Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge » (1992)
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L'A. remet en question la these de M. Engel, i.e. la connaissance serait en definitive qu'une question de chance, these developpee dans son article « Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge » (1992)
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Ancient Philosophy, 2022
The Stoics held that knowledge depends on the special kind of true appearances they called ‘apprehensive.’ Sextus Empiricus reports that they also thought that some true appearances are not apprehensive—and hence unable to lead to knowledge—because they are true merely ‘externally and by chance’, which suggests that the Stoics were aware of the problem
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The Stoics held that knowledge depends on the special kind of true appearances they called ‘apprehensive.’ Sextus Empiricus reports that they also thought that some true appearances are not apprehensive—and hence unable to lead to knowledge—because they are true merely ‘externally and by chance’, which suggests that the Stoics were aware of the problem
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Epistemic Entitlement and Luck
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not ...
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2005
AbstractOne of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements.
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AbstractOne of the key supposed ‘platitudes’ of contemporary epistemology is the claim that knowledge excludes luck. One can see the attraction of such a claim, in that knowledge is something that one can take credit for; it is an achievement of sorts, and yet luck undermines genuine achievements.
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Against epistemic accounts of luck
Analysis, 2023Abstract Epistemic accounts of luck define luck’s chanciness condition relative to a subject’s epistemic position. This could be put in terms of a subject’s evidence or knowledge about whether the event will occur. I argue that both versions of the epistemic account fail.
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