Results 211 to 220 of about 673 (243)
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk
Erkenntnis, 2021We are witnessing a certain tendency in epistemology to account for the anti-luck intuition in terms of risk. I.e., instead of the traditional anti-luck diagnosis of Gettier cases and fake barn cases, a new anti-risk diagnosis seems to be preferable by many.
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Armchair luck: Apriority, intellection and epistemic luck
Acta Analytica, 2007The paper argues that there is such a thing as luck in acquisition of candidate apriori beliefs and knowledge, and that the possibility of luck in this “armchair” domain shows that definitions of believing by luck thatp offered in literature are inadequate, since they mostly rely on the possibility of it being the case that not-p.
Nenad Miscevic, Miscevic Nenad
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In defense of an epistemic probability account of luck
SynthÈse, 2018Many philosophers think that part of what makes an event lucky concerns how probable that event is. In this paper, I argue that an epistemic probability account of luck successfully resists recent arguments that all theories of luck, including probability theories, are subject to counterexample (Hales in Nous 50(3):490–508, 2016). I argue that an event
Gregory Stoutenburg
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Metaphilosophy, 2006
: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of ...
Duncan Pritchard
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: It is maintained that the arguments put forward by Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel in their widely influential exchange on the problem of moral luck are marred by a failure to (i) present a coherent understanding of what is involved in the notion of luck, and (ii) adequately distinguish between the problem of moral luck and the analogue problem of ...
Duncan Pritchard
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Synthese, 2009
Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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Although many philosophers have argued that an event is lucky for an agent only if it was suitably improbable, there is considerable disagreement about how to understand this improbability condition. This paper argues for a hitherto overlooked construal of the improbability condition in terms of the lucky agent’s epistemic situation.
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2005
AbstractI discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only (at best) eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all ...
Duncan Pritchard, Pritchard Duncan
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AbstractI discuss the sceptical challenge in the light of the distinction between veritic and reflective epistemic luck and argue that the inadequacy of the main anti-sceptical proposals in the contemporary literature is a result of how they only (at best) eliminate veritic luck, and thus do not engage with the problem of reflective luck at all ...
Duncan Pritchard, Pritchard Duncan
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The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 1994
L'A. remet en question la these de M. Engel, i.e. la connaissance serait en definitive qu'une question de chance, these developpee dans son article « Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge » (1992)
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L'A. remet en question la these de M. Engel, i.e. la connaissance serait en definitive qu'une question de chance, these developpee dans son article « Is Epistemic Luck Compatible with Knowledge » (1992)
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Philosophy Compass, 2011
Abstract Epistemologists often remark that knowledge precludes luck. A true belief based on a guess or hunch is not knowledge because it seems merely fortuitous, too much of an accident, and, well, lucky that one happened to get things right. Of course, true beliefs based on guesses and hunches are not justified.
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Abstract Epistemologists often remark that knowledge precludes luck. A true belief based on a guess or hunch is not knowledge because it seems merely fortuitous, too much of an accident, and, well, lucky that one happened to get things right. Of course, true beliefs based on guesses and hunches are not justified.
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Epistemic Entitlement and Luck
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014The aim of this paper is to defend a novel characterization of epistemic luck. Helping myself to the notions of epistemic entitlement and adequate explanation, I propose that a true belief suffers from epistemic luck iff an adequate explanation of the fact that the belief acquired is true must appeal to propositions to which the subject herself is not ...
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